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Introduction 
 
The report ‘A Fair Globalisation: Creating Opportunities for All’ of the 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation claims that 
regional integration can contribute to a more equitable pattern of globalisation, 
but only if regional integration has a strong social dimension. According to the 
Commission, regional arrangements can achieve this by empowering people and 
countries to better manage the global economic forces, by helping to build 
capabilities needed to take advantage of global opportunities, and by improving 
the conditions under which people connect to the global economy (WCSDG, 
2004:71). 
   
It is true that, at least in theory, regional integration schemes can offer a 
number of possibilities for the development of, for example: 
  
- regional social, health and labour regulations; 
- regional mechanisms that give citizens a voice to challenge their 
governments in terms of social rights;  
- regional intergovernmental forms of co-operation in social policy;  
- regional cross-border investments in the area of social policy;   
- regional social redistribution schemes (Yeates and Deacon, 2006; Deacon, 
Ortiz and Zelenev, 2007);  
- regional coordination of economic and developmental policies;  
- regional initiatives in capacity building and innovation to strengthen the 
capabilities of people; or 
- inter-regional agreements and arrangements related to social issues.  
 
The rationales for such regional social policies include: seeking protection 
from market forces, which are increasingly regional and global, and the ‘race to 
the bottom’, generating economies of scale, international risk pooling, and 
seeking a stronger voice in international and national negotiations (Deacon, Ortiz 
and Zelenev, 2007:8-10). 
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Within the UN system, such ideas about reinforcing the regional level in 
order to ‘tame’ globalisation are increasingly popular. In the July 2006 session of 
ECOSOC the UN Secretary-General declared that multi-stakeholder policy 
dialogues at the national and regional level have to be developed “with the 
objective of building national and regional capacity to develop a multi-
disciplinary approach to economic and social issues” (UNSG, 2006). Earlier that 
year, UNESCO organised a High-Level Symposium on the Social Policy 
Dimension of Regionalism in Montevideo in the context of the UNESCO 
International Social Sciences Policy Nexus Forum (Deacon, Yeates and Van 
Langenhove, 2006). The resulting Buenos Aires Declaration called upon “the 
regional organisations such as MERCOSUR and the African Union, in 
association with social scientists and civil society, to further develop the social 
dimension of regional integration and [called] upon the UN to facilitate inter-
regional dialogues”. 
 
Nevertheless, it remains a question for empirical research to determine to 
what extent the regional level is indeed (becoming), as the ILO report claimed, ‘a 
stepping stone’ to take advantage of global opportunities and to ensure that the 
benefits of globalisation are fairly distributed.  
 
The present report presents an overview of some recent trends and future 
challenges regarding the deepening of the social dimensions of regional 
integration, in light of the Recommendations of the Report of the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation. The focus will be mostly 
on socio-economic and labour-related issues (regional social dialogues, common 
frameworks on labour standards, coordination of social and labour market 
policies, coordination of FDI policies, labour migration, skills recognition etc.). 
Health, utilities regulation, housing, disaster prevention and management, 
conflict prevention, and human rights were also identified as potential areas for 
regional social policies (Deacon, Ortiz and Zelenev, 2007), but the developments 
in these fields are left outside the scope of this document.  
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The way the social dimension of regional integration is and will be shaped 
depends on the ‘depth’ of the regionalisation process in the respective regions. 
As the WCSDG Report rightly acknowledges, regional arrangements take many 
different forms: from free trade areas to ‘deeper’ political and economic projects 
(WCSDG, 2004:71). In this paper, we will refer to both ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ 
regional arrangements. And whereas we will focus on institutionalised forms of 
regional integration, if relevant we will also refer to some other regional 
cooperative schemes in our overview, such as the regional consultative processes 
for migration. Considering this institutional variety will allow us to assess the 
present and future of regional (social) governance in some detail. 
 
The report is organized in six sections. In section one, the WCSDG Report 
is taken as point of reference for a general reflection on the opportunities and 
challenges that regional social governance presents for making globalization 
‘fairer’. Next, a tour-du-monde of trends and challenges in different regions in 
the world is presented. The tour starts in the European Union (EU), as it is the 
deepest and most institutionalised regional integration scheme (section two), 
before assessing the emergence of a social dialogue and a social dimension of the 
regional integration processes in the Americas (section three), Africa (section 
four), and Asia and the Pacific (section five). Section six concludes. 
 
 
1. Regional Governance for a Fair Globalization 
 
The Report on ‘A Fair Globalization’ presents a whole list of policy 
recommendations that should contribute to a better distribution of the potential 
benefits (and costs) of globalization. These recommendations target the different 
governance levels: national, regional and global. Policies and rules shaped at 
these different levels by different instances and actors should therefore be seen in 
the context of a multi-level governance reality. In this document, the focus is on 
the regional level, although linkages and compatibilities with what is happening 
at the other levels should be constantly taken into account. The WCSDG refers to 
the regional governance level with respect to: (i) the need to build representative 
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regional institutions and organize regional social dialogues, (ii) the importance of 
linking trade liberalization (at the global and regional level) to the respect for 
labour rights, (iii) the need to make investment rules more development-friendly, 
and (iv) the urgency to provide a more appropriate regulatory framework for 
migration. 
 
Strengthening democratic regional governance and establishing regional 
social dialogues 
 
The WCSDG referred quite extensively to the need to strengthen regional 
governance, based on principles of participation and democratic accountability: 
“Representative bodies, such as regional parliaments, have an important role to 
play. We believe that regional integration should be advanced through social 
dialogue between representative organisations of workers and employers, and 
wider dialogue with other important social actors, on the basis of strong 
institutions for democratic and judicial accountability. The creation of tripartite 
or wider councils and forums at the regional level (…) provides an important 
institutional framework for such dialogue” (WCSDG, 2004:73). 
 
A striking feature of globalisation, as the WCSDG rightly stated, has been 
the rapid emergence of a community of civil society organisations (CSOs), who 
network globally to tackle issues of concern to citizens throughout the world. 
While the nature and frequency of contact and mode of interaction between 
international agencies and CSOs vary, the trend towards increased collaboration 
has been across the board. CSOs and other non-state actors are increasingly 
looking for their place in the international system (Weiss and Gordenker, 1996; 
Willetts, 1996; Fox and Brown, 1998; Higgott, et. al., 2000; Scholte, 2004b) and 
make a major contribution to raising and debating the issue of a fairer 
globalisation. They raise public awareness, undertake research, document the 
impact of globalisation on people, communities and the environment, mobilise 
public opinion and ensure democratic accountability. CSOs increasingly start to 
change the nature of global social dialogue (WCSDG, 2004:125). 
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The focus on participation within regional integration is mainly a 
governance question about whether regional bodies have the mandate to address 
social concerns, and if so, how they are in fact addressing them. What role do 
regional structures play in social dialogue? Some copy existing tripartite 
negotiation forums like EESC, other regional organisations are still looking for 
appropriate ways to consult CSOs and try to overcome specific regional 
difficulties. 
 
Fair trade through the protection of labour rights 
 
Increasing openness to global competition has imposed costs on labour in 
industrial countries through downward pressure on wages, the erosion of social 
security systems, the weakening of trade unions and labour standards. In 
developing countries, increasing openness has exacerbated child labour and other 
violations of core labour standards established by the ILO (Granger and Siroën, 
2006). 
 
In its assessment of multilateral trade rules, the WCSDG stressed the 
importance of a generalized adherence to the ILO Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work in order to protect and promote workers’ rights 
worldwide as an essential aspect of ‘fair trade’ (WCSDG, 2004:82). At the same 
time, the WCSDG favoured a-symmetric obligations as a function of the 
development levels of the trading partners (WCSDG, 2004:85). Attempts by the 
international trade union movement and other civil society groups to establish a 
global, legally binding regime of social standards have not been successful. The 
multilateral approach to labour standards in the WTO was rejected at the 
Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 and a similar political consensus was 
repeated in the Doha Declaration of 2001. Opposition to a multilateral regime for 
social standards came from developing countries’ governments (but also business 
and economists) who feared that it would undermine their comparative advantage 
in low wage, labour-intensive industries (Dasgupta, 2000). 
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While the trade-labour linkage has been side-stepped at the multilateral 
level, labour standards are now increasingly incorporated into Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) and bilateral FTAs, led by the United States and the EU 
(Greven, 2005; Grynberg and Qualo, 2006). Since the early 1980s, and the early 
1990s respectively, they are both also using unilateral measures such as the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which operates under the WTO, for 
purposes of improving labour standards in developing countries.  
 
The US has been a leader in advancing bilateral and regional FTAs as the 
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations has run into increasing difficulties. 
Many of its bilateral FTAs are North-South agreements, based on asymmetric 
negotiating power. Because developing countries are too weak to refuse the 
demands of their most important trading partners, they are now often accepting at 
the bilateral and regional level what they have refused at the multilateral level. 
The “rush to regionalism” has included a number of contentious “behind-the-
border issues” such as investment rules, intellectual property rights and, to some 
extent, labour rights (IISD, 2004). From the perspective of developing countries, 
resisting the priorities of industrialised countries in these fields is considerably 
more difficult than in multilateral trade negotiations. We cannot address the 
larger question of whether the highly controversial linkage of core labour rights 
(as defined by the 1998 ILO Declaration) to trade is “protectionism in disguise” 
or beneficial from a development perspective (as well as from a human rights 
perspective). However, it is useful to take a closer look at the recent 
developments regarding labour rights provisions in regional FTAs (see sections 2 
to 5).  
 
Towards development-friendly regional-global investment rules 
 
From the perspective of workers in developing countries, the implications 
of increased openness are to a large extent independent from the ownership 
(national versus foreign) of the firms where they are employed. However, 
employment in MNE subsidiaries has a number of specific characteristics related 
to the scale of the company, the mobility of the subsidiaries, and their integration 
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in global production chains. At the same time, host countries have some degrees 
of freedom to tackle socio-economic issues through their foreign investment 
policies and regimes. 
 
The current regulatory landscape for FDI is fractioned, lacks transparency and, 
contrary to other areas of economic regulation, is characterized by a very 
weak multilateral governance level (Young and Tavares, 2004; Reiter, 
2006). At the same time, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment 
clauses in regional agreements have proliferated.2 Both types of agreements 
have come under closer scrutiny and have met with stronger opposition. It is 
this situation that led the WCSDG Report to emphasize the need for a 
multilateral development-friendly regulatory framework for FDI (WCSDG, 
2004:34,87,106), to be achieved through a policy development dialogue 
involving all relevant international organisations with a balanced 
representation of all interests (WCSDG, 2004:136). The Commission also 
referred to the regional dimension in a number of occasions: 
 
- it observed the increase in the number of BITs and investment clauses in 
regional agreements and expressed its concern “that developing countries 
may be accepting un-favourable terms in BITs as a result of unbalanced 
negotiations with stronger developed country partners” (WCSDG, 
2004:87); 
- it recommended collective action, especially among developing countries 
and starting at the regional level, to define their interests, avoid incentive 
competition and negotiate regulatory frameworks, which could then 
                                               
2
 The stock of concluded BITs is now above 2500 of which around 2000 are currently in force (Lizarazo, 
1997; UNCTAD, 2005, 2006a). However, the new trend towards the renegotiation of BITs indicates the 
imperfection of the regulatory framework and indicates the existence of problems in the application of 
BITs, especially in a North-South context (UNCTAD, 2006a:2). The proliferation of new generation 
FTAs with investment provisions is considered as the most important recent phenomenon in international 
rulemaking on investment (Reiter, 2006). These so-called Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements 
(PTIAs), as defined by UNCTAD (2006b), have demonstrated a rising trend over the most recent years 
and doubled their number since 2000, bringing the stock of concluded PTIAs at the end of 2005 at 232. 
On the basis of the negotiation processes under way UNCTAD, expects even more pronounced increases 
in the coming years. Developing countries are party to 79% of all PTIAs, developed countries are party to 
54% of the agreements (UNCTAD, 2006b:7). 
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become the building blocks of a multilateral framework (WCSDG, 
2004:86-88); and 
- it observed the over-concentration of FDI inflows in certain developing 
sub-regions and countries and suggested that a better spread can be 
reached through stable and transparent business and regulatory 
environments (WCSDG, 2004:27-29). 
 
Regional collective action and rulemaking, as suggested by the 
Commission, could indeed reproduce a number of potential benefits of a 
multilateral investment regime (greater transparency and less incompatibilities 
leading to lower transaction costs, less rules competition among capital 
importing countries, …), while at the same time making progress on, for 
example, finding a new balance between domestic policy objectives and 
investment provisions and reaching more transparency and balance in dispute 
settlement. Collective renegotiation of BITs at the regional level might be an 
interesting option, although the economically and politically ‘optimal size’ of the 
regions remains to be established, as well as the legal bases for such collective 
action.3 
 
We see at least three investment-related aspects on which developing 
regions could take new initiatives, with the potential to contribute to a more 
harmonious relationship between FDI policies, on the one hand, and socio-
economic policies, on the other. The first refers to a balanced re-evaluation of the 
inclusion of performance criteria in investment regimes in the light of their future 
regulation. 4  Whereas European type BITs tend not to include provisions on 
                                               
3
 An interesting phenomenon in this respect is the emergence of plurilateral organisations that have 
played a role in promoting BITs or drafting BITs for their members include the Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Committee (AALCC) who published a BIT model, and the ACP Group who pursued the 
signature of BITs within the framework of the Lomé conventions (Dolzer and Stevens, 1995:5-7). 
Regional organizations have played similar roles. For example, a convention was signed between 
CARICOM and Venezuela aiming at the promotion of BITs between the latter and any individual 
member of the regional organization. 
4
 These requirements were used extensively by host countries during the 1960s up to the 1980s as a 
partial substitute of more restrictive controls over FDI. They seek to link the benefits and guarantees for 
foreign investors to reaching minimum levels of local content, employment, exports, knowledge transfer, 
etc. Given its nature as a mechanism to enhance benefits to the host economy derived from foreign 
investment and due to its distortionary effects on the allocation of resources at a global level, developed 
countries promoted the dismantling of performance criteria through the negotiation of bilateral and 
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performance criteria, the US/NAFTA type agreements feature restrictions on 
performance criteria. The majority of BITs concluded between developing 
countries do not address performance requirements. 5  Free trade agreements 
usually do include provisions on performance requirements. 
 
The second aspect refers to the enhancement of the degree of transparency 
in dispute settlement between investors and host countries. This is one of the 
aspects of the last generation BITs, especially those following the US model, that 
has been heavily criticized by civil society organisations and trade unions. 
According to Petersen (2005:8), the most notable of all features of recent BITs 
has indeed been the incorporation of clauses granting foreign investors direct 
legal personality under international law. Contrary to the WTO practice, where 
disputes are settled between governments, investors protected by BITs can bring 
their claims against the host country governments directly before external 
arbitration tribunals, thereby avoiding the national host country jurisdiction. As 
there is no unique multilateral framework for investment, dispute settlement is 
arranged in different ways. In most of the recent BITs, dispute settlement clauses 
refer to ICSID; to a lesser extent to the rules of the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and even less to the arbitration facility of 
the International Chamber of Commerce or to the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (Petersen, 2005:9; UNCTAD, 2006c). Only 
in the case of ICSID all arbitrations are publicly disclosed. This makes it difficult 
to monitor investment-related conflicts as possible indicators of the quality of the 
international investment regime, and explains part of the criticism on the lack of 
transparency and accountability in these matters from the side of civil society and 
                                                                                                                                          
regional investment agreements, although quite some variability between the contents of individual 
(bilateral and regional) agreements can be observed (CNUST, 1988; Lizarazo Rodríguez, 1997). At the 
multilateral level, the agreement on TRIMs (‘Dunkel text’) of 1991 prohibits ‘local content requirements’ 
and ‘trade balancing requirements’ as conflicting with the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and the 
GATT principle of national treatment. The agreement also included an illustrative list of TRIMs (GATT, 
1994:166-167). The agreement was of particular importance for Latin American and Southeast Asian 
industrializing economies, where local content and export requirements were often used in their –mainly 
national-- investment regimes (Takacs, 1994; Cuyvers et al., 1996). The implementation of the TRIMs 
framework for performance requirements has been slow (Reiter, 2006). A majority of countries have not 
fulfilled their notification obligations and many developing countries negotiated longer phase-out periods 
for performance requirements. 
5
 Exceptions are, for example, the BITs between the Dominican Republic and Ecuador and between El 
Salvador and Peru. 
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certain countries. From the information that is available, it can be inferred that 
only since the beginning of the 1990s, litigation related to BITs has really taken 
off. It has steadily risen since then and averaging about 10 arbitrations per year 
over the decade. Especially arbitrations under the NAFTA regime explained this 
growth. In 2003, the numbers increased dramatically and since they amount to 
more than 35 cases per year (Petersen, 2005:12), although a stagnation seems to 
be observable since 2005 (UNCTAD (2006c:2). Many analysts see these figures 
as a warning light, indicating that BITs seem to start to generate problems 
especially in developing countries and that therefore the instrument should be re-
evaluated and re-designed. Many of these problems are related to the emergence 
of unforeseen policy implications of treaty commitments. Petersen (2005) has 
summarized these as follows: (i) the combination of vague and  open-ended 
treaty texts and the application of standard BIT models, on the one hand, and the 
un-transparent, ad hoc and decentralized dispute settlement, on the other, is 
leading to increasingly divergent and conflicting rulings; (ii) BITs may restrict 
the taxation powers of the host country when tax measures are contested by 
investors as indirect forms of expropriation; (iii) bilateral treaties may restrict the 
possibilities for host governments to regulate in the public interest in areas such 
as health, education, safety or the environment; (iv) BITs may hinder positive 
discrimination measures that seek to remedy past injustices (for example, in 
favour of minority or indigenous groups). UNCTAD sees the surge in investment 
disputes not necessarily as unhealthy by itself. However, it acknowledges the 
vulnerability of developing countries because of their limited technical and 
financial resources to handle the disputes and the potential impact on their 
reputation. UNCTAD therefore calls for more technical assistance to developing 
countries (UNCTAD, 2006c:8). Regional coordination and consolidation of 
resources would therefore be most welcome. 
 
A final aspect on which new action could be taken by regional organizations 
concerns the non-binding Codes of Conduct for MNEs. These are not new 
instruments but the EU has recently picked-up the idea again and has linked it to 
the concept of corporate social responsibility. Although such initiatives are 
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positive per se, the effectiveness and potential scope of non-binding guidelines 
probably need further assessment from the side of developing countries. 
 
Building a regulatory framework for international migration: the role of 
regions6 
 
Apart from the quantitative growth in migration flows experienced in the 
last decades and foreseen for the coming decades (Channac, 2007a,b), the 
patterns of cross-border movements have also changed deeply and qualitatively 
with the globalisation process and the evolutions it entails in terms of mobility 
and communication. As a result, some new political preoccupations now emerge 
as priorities on the global agenda, such as the fight against human trafficking and 
smuggling, the increase of irregular migration as opportunities to follow regular 
migration routes have been curtailed, or even the development of internal 
displacements. Moreover, the human and social rights of migrants and members 
of their families remain very often ignored or consciously scorned. Quite often 
migrants lose their entitlements to social security benefits in their home country 
owing to their absence, and at the same time, they encounter restrictive 
conditions in the host country with regard to their coverage by the national social 
security system (GCIM, 2005:18). On the other hand, many host countries 
welcome migrant workers’ contribution to their social pension funds as a way of 
sustaining their pension schemes. However, mechanisms that ensure that retired 
migrants can fully benefit from the old age pension scheme once they return to 
their country of origin are often absent or underdeveloped. Hence, the same 
payment obligations are imposed on domestic and migrant workers, but the latter 
are unable to derive the same benefits if they go back. This situation creates 
strong incentives for migrant workers to work in the informal sector of the 
economy and to stay after their period of employment has expired.  
 
However, cross-border movements of people concern more and more 
countries around the world. If well managed – orderly and cooperatively - cross-
                                               
6
 A more elaborated treatment of the issues covered in this section, including their linkages with 
initiatives at the global level, can be found in Channac (2007a).  
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border movements can trigger or enhance economic and social development, 
both in countries of origin and destination, as shown by the recent interest in the 
role of remittances or notions such as “brain circulation”. Migration patterns and 
issues (forced migration, remittances, etc.) may differ and evolve sensibly 
between regions (UN, 2004a, 2006). Regional specificities exist, related to the 
nature of migration in the different regions, as regards integration or return 
policies, or, more generally, immigration or emigration policies (UN, 2006, 
2004a-b, 2002). Nonetheless, much more emphasis is now put, at this regional 
level, on the positive effects of cross-border movements of people as regards 
developmental issues for developing countries, or economic growth and 
demographic deficit compensation for industrialised aging countries, and, 
consequently, on the means to reap these benefits by managing migration orderly 
and efficiently. 
 
In its final report, acknowledging these changes in migration patterns and 
policies, the WCSDG recommends the development of a multilateral framework 
for “orderly and managed” cross-border movements of people, a framework that 
could contribute to “enhance global productivity” and “eliminate exploitative 
practices” by “complementing measures to achieve a more balanced strategy for 
global growth and full employment”. According to the World Commission, with 
a global framework based on more democratic rules and the respect of the human 
rights of migrants, the countries of origin and destination, as well as the migrants 
themselves, could maximize the benefits of migration and minimize the negative 
sides: this framework could “provide uniform and transparent rules for cross-
border movements of people” and “balance the interests of both migrants 
themselves and of countries of origin and destination”. The WCSDG insisted 
further on the fact that “the issues and problems associated with the movement of 
people across national borders cannot be addressed by single countries acting in 
isolation or on a unilateral basis”. Thus, this implies the development of effective 
cooperation arenas at the regional level. 
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The actions proposed by the World Commission are three-fold: first, 
enhanced complementarity and coherence between different levels of 
governance, regional integration being a necessary but insufficient step if not 
complemented by a global framework; second, a broad-based decision-making 
framework, that is a framework opening governance processes to new actors 
having interests and/or expertise in the field of migration; and third, revitalized 
international institutions, towards an approach to multilateralism based on the 
enlargement and the respect of the human rights of migrants workers and the 
members of their families, the revitalization of international institutions being 
also an important tool to promote deeper regional integration (WCSDG, 
2004:94,96-99). 
 
Since the 1990s, dialogues on the governance of migration have been 
gradually set up at the regional level, and this is an element consistent with the 
WCSDG’s recommendation (WCSDG, 2004:74). However, if regional 
cooperation is indeed expanding, it is nonetheless necessary to remain cautious 
on its nature and purposes, but as well on its real contribution to the promotion of 
a more social approach of migration management. In fact, at the regional level, 
cooperation can follow two main different, but also complementary, ways: 
migration management can then fall in the ambit of regional integration 
processes or agreements, which are formal, mainly binding, agreements, and/or 
cooperation for migration can also be developed through informal and non-
binding consultative regional processes. 
 
Regional Consultative Processes for Migration (RCPs) have multiplied in 
various regions of the world.7 Even if all these processes have some peculiar 
characteristics depending on different regional contexts and on the conditions 
                                               
7
 For instance, for Africa, the MIDSA (Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa — 2000) and the 
MIDWA (Migration Dialogue for West Africa — 2001); for central and east Asia, the Bali Conference 
(2002), the Manila Process (1996) or the Issik-Kul Dialogue (2000) ; for North America, Latin America 
and the Caribbean islands, the South American Conference on Migration (Lima Process — 1999), the 
Regional Conference on Migration (Puebla Process — 1996) or the Seminar for the Caribbean Region; 
and, for Europe, the IGC (Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies 
in Europe, North America and Australia — 1985) and the Budapest Process (1991-93) (Klein Solomon, 
2005; Thouez and Channac, 2005). 
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determining their creation, they all share some essential common characteristics 
which allows gathering them under the generic name of regional consultative 
processes for migration. Three main characteristics distinguish the RCPs from 
classic regional or international institutions: “(1) informality — they are a 
process, not an institution, meaning that working toward an eventual goal is an 
important aspect of the process; (2) openness — as agreement on all issues is not 
required, all options can be explored openly, thus increasing the number of 
possible solutions to issues; (3) efficiency — as there is a minimum 
administration, direct communication is more easily possible between high level 
officials and experts in regional consultative processes.” (Klekowski von 
Koppenfelds, 2001; Thouez and Channac, 2005; Thouez and Channac, 2006). 
Consequently, what elements could indicate that these RCPs work towards 
promoting a more social approach of migration management at the regional level 
or not? 
 
The RCPs’ main aim is to build networks of information exchange between 
participating governments, and so to promote, on the one hand, relations of trust 
and confidence amongst actors, and then a common understanding of migration 
issues, and, on the other hand, some convergence, harmonization, in migration 
practices and policies between various levels of decision-making, from the global 
to the national level — and/or the other way round.8 To enhance multilateral 
cooperation at the regional level, RCPs lean partly on existing formal regional 
agreements or institutions. Previous experiments of regional multilateral 
cooperation probably facilitate the establishment of new RCPs.9  
 
However if RCPs are facilitating networking at the regional level, UN 
institutions could play a crucial role in developing the “open-regionalism” 
                                               
8
 For a critical evaluation of the RCPs, see Commission on Human Security (2003), Channac (2004, 
2007a), and Thouez and Channac (2005). 
9
 In Africa, while associating some southern EU states, the Conference on Western Mediterranean 
Cooperation (5+5) also gathers all the UMA’s member states (Union of Arabic Maghreb). In addition, 
the MIDSA (Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa) exactly follows the borders of SADC and of 
COMESA; and ECOWAS and the UEMOA are closely associated to the development of the MIDWA 
(Migration Dialogue for West Africa). In Latin America, RCMPs are bound to regional economic 
groupings, such as MERCOSUR, OAS, or even CARICOM. For Asia and the Pacific, ASEAN, SAARC, 
PIF and APEC support the majority of the RCPs. 
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evocated by the World Commission. Migration flows are not only taking 
place between countries inside the same region; they also have an important 
inter-regional and inter-continental dimension.  
This was also one of the RCP’s shortcomings identified by the Global 
Commission for International Migration in its final report, which recommended 
that “additional efforts are required to ensure that regional consultative processes 
on migration have worldwide coverage, engage civil society and the private 
sector, and are not focused solely on migration control” because “greater 
interaction between the different processes is essential given the global nature of 
migration” (GCIM, 2005:70,82). This conclusion surely agrees with those of the 
WCSDG as regards cross-border movements of people. Some recent initiatives 
tend to settle such inter-regional cooperation processes.10  
 
Enhancing intra-regional portability of skills and labour qualifications11 
 
In most regions of the world unskilled workers such as construction 
workers, domestic workers, and agricultural labourers dominate the flow of 
migration. However, skilled, professional, and business migration has gained in 
importance in recent years. The migration flow to high-income countries has 
increasingly been dominated by skilled migration (Salt, 2001:17).  
 
                                               
10
 This is the case, for instance, of the African Union, following the resolution adopted in 2001, that 
considered a draft Migration Policy Framework for Africa, a document that proposes guidelines for 
migration management not only at the sub-regional level, but more broadly for the African region, 
encompassing sub-regional cooperation processes (African Union, 2006). Another interesting example of 
the development of inter-regional initiatives is the Brussels Declaration on Asylum, Migration and 
Mobility – and the Plan of Action – adopted by the Governments of the ACP Group during the 1st ACP 
Meeting of Ministers responsible for Asylum, Migration and Mobility held in Brussels in April 2006. The 
main objective of this Meeting was to formulate concrete ACP policies on asylum, migration and 
mobility to address migration issues in a cooperative, coordinated and efficient manner. Furthermore, the 
2nd ACP Civil Society Forum, which took place in Brussels in April 2006, complemented the defined 
ACP Position on Migration and Mobility, and clearly indicated the importance granted to non-state 
actors’ involvement in the debate on migration for the ACP Group (ACP, 2006a,b,c). Another example of 
the development of inter-regional initiatives has been the launch, in 2003, of a discussion, in the 
framework of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), on a draft model agreement 
for migration, as legal migration is the item n°5 on the AALCO’ work programme. Earlier, in June 2001, 
in New Delhi, the AALCO adopted a “final text of the AALCO’s 1966 Bangkok principles on status and 
treatment of refugees Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (Resolution 40/3), an instrument 
that seeks to strengthen refugee protection in these two regions. 
11
 For more elaborated treatment of this issues covered in this section see Hartmann (2006) 
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The issue of brain drain and brain gain is highly related to the mobility of 
skilled labour. Cadres with internationally or regionally recognised skills and 
qualifications are more likely to migrate. In general, there is a high correlation 
between FDI and skilled labour migration. The recognition of qualifications 
improves migrant workers’ access to positions at the upper end of the value 
chains in the host countries. Such positions are usually linked to improved 
rewards (salary and other benefits) and a higher status in the host country. As a 
result, recognition is likely to have a positive impact on the level of remittances. 
The recognition of skills has also positive effects for the host country as it creates 
incentives for migrants to work in the formal sector in spite of the difficulties 
they may encounter as regards social security benefits. Some sending countries 
have deliberately started to train more professionals than their labour market can 
absorb with a view to taking advantage of the shortage of skilled labour in high-
income countries and to capitalise on their quality training programmes. 
However, for other countries that do not have the capacity to produce enough 
qualified labour even for the domestic market such a brain drain may have a 
devastating impact. Nevertheless, even when countries train more people than 
they need for their domestic market, they are confronted with major problems 
related to remittances as long as no compensation mechanisms are in place. This 
money usually goes back to private households in the home country, and the 
government, which usually paid at least part of the training costs, receives little 
money. Host countries, on the other hand, benefit from skilled labour from 
abroad without paying the cost of their education. In short, benefits and costs are 
unequally distributed. 
 
The ILO Human Resource Development Recommendation, adopted in 
2004, calls upon ILO members to promote recognition and portability of skills, 
competences and qualifications not only at the national but also at the 
international level (ILO, 2004a). The Committee on Employment and Social 
Policy, whose mandate it is to advise the Governing Body of the ILO, has put 
this issue on the agenda with a view of further promoting the transferability and 
recognition of skills in the context of the Global Employment Agenda (GEA) 
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(ILO 2007). The ILO recommends the strengthening of quality assurance for 
training and education and underlines the importance of social dialogue and 
collective bargaining within this framework. At the centre of the 
recommendation lies the establishment of national qualifications frameworks. 
We will outline the recognition regulations of a selected number of regional 
integration agreements such as the EU, MERCOSUR, CARICOM, NAFTA, 
SADC, ASEAN, SAARC and some more other bilateral agreements in the 
following sections. Particular attention will be paid to the efforts of the EU where 
a regional recognition regime has been developed furthest. 
 
 
2. The Contribution of the EU to a Fair Globalisation 
 
Europe has experienced accelerated economic integration over the past two 
decades. The creation of a unified regional market has been achieved by wide-
ranging liberalisation of trade, services capital and labour markets – all of which 
has brought major adjustment costs in its wake. The process has been pushed 
even further by the formation of economic and monetary union (EMU), which 
has removed countries’ ability to use the exchange rate to deal with economic 
problems. Consequently, countries have to rely more on policies such as labour 
market flexibility to adjust to external shocks. The overall result has been 
increased competition and increased adjustment pressures (Ardy, Begg, Schelke, 
Torres, 2002). 
 
Economic integration has brought positive results through higher economic 
growth and reduction of poverty. In parallel to this, social cohesion has been 
achieved by combining economic integration with flanking social measures. 
Since the 1980s, under pressure from social groups, social policy has been 
gradually built up. About half of its social policy directives have been established 
in the 1990s. Today,  the ‘social acquis’  includes harmonised standards 
governing occupational health and safety of workers in the workplace as well as 
other aspects of employment such as gender equality and  non-discrimination; 
the creation of a European Charter of social rights, and the pursuit of the social 
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dialogue at the European level through the creation of  European Works Councils 
(Gavin, 2001). 
 
A ‘social policy protocol’, based on the 1989 Charter on the Fundamental 
Rights of Workers, was annexed to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Some member 
countries, notably the UK, refused to sign the Charter. Following the election of 
Tony Blair the social policy protocol was repealed and the social agreement was 
incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which since then provides the 
legal basis for social policy directives under articles 138 and 139 of the EC 
Treaty.  
 
‘Social dialogue’ in the EU refers to the bipartite dialogue between 
management and labour unions at the regional level to negotiate framework 
agreements on various aspects of employment for example the first framework 
agreement of 1995 was on parental leave. These agreements are then presented to 
the Commission in the framework of the tripartite dialogue and if accepted then 
become EC directives. Progress in this framework has lead to an increasing 
number of European laws including the equal treatment of men and women, 
protection of workers health and safety, social security, information and 
consultation of workers etc, as well as on special measures to combat social 
exclusion. 
 
The Nice Treaty, which entered into force on 1 February 2003, strengthened 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in its role as the 
institutional representative, at the European level, of organised civil society. The 
civil society dialogue is not to be confused with the social dialogue as they are 
quite separate concepts. Civil society dialogue applies to all legislation of the EU 
and not just social policy. Civil society dialogue is concerned about getting better 
legislation and about making the Commission more accountable. In the 
interpretation of the EESC, the organised civil society encompasses three groups: 
the employers’ group, the employees group and the more recent group with 
various interest groups. The EESC is increasingly involving CSOs and European 
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and trans-national networks that are not (yet) directly represented within it in its 
work by various means. It was strengthened in this process by the European 
Commission, which made a commitment to cooperate with it within the 
framework of a Protocol signed on 7 November 2005, replacing the previous 
Protocol of 24 September 2001 (EESC, 2005). In February 2004, the EESC 
adopted several proposals for stronger and more structured cooperation with 
European CSOs. The EESC decided to set up a Liaison Group to interact with 
these organisations and designed to be both a liaison body and a structure for 
political dialogue. The Liaison Group ensures that the EESC has a coordinated 
approach towards these organisations, as well as monitoring joint initiatives.  
 
Structural funds – between development and social policy 
 
Since 1989, the creation of a financial mechanism to aid the development of 
the poorest countries and regions through the structural funds has become a key 
policy. The amount of funding available has increased significantly and 
management of the funds has been completely reformed. The increased 
importance of the structural funds reflected the fears of policy makers that the 
accelerated integration resulting from the internal market programme of 1992 
and the commitment to EMU adopted in 1993 could exacerbate disparities 
between rich and poor countries unless remedial measures were taken. It also 
signalled a political message of solidarity to the poorer countries that they would 
receive assistance to help them address the adjustment costs that could result 
from the quickening pace of integration. 
 
Compared to other regions, Europe has achieved a significant degree of 
equitable development 12  that is reflected in the increasing convergence of 
incomes. In the past, the poorest countries were Ireland, Spain and Portugal, all 
of whom have benefited from EU membership. Ireland’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita rose from 60 per cent of the EU average, when it joined the EU 
in 1973, to 125 per cent in 2002. Spain and Portugal, with respective GDP per 
                                               
12
 The divergence between income per capita between the richest and poorest countries in the EU-25 is 
ten to one, whereas in East Asia, the rate is that of a hundred to one. 
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capita of 71 per cent and 54 per cent at the time of accession in 1986, reached 86 
and 71 per cent in 2002. The poorest countries in the EU today are the former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) who joined in 2007. 
Short-term indications point to the fact that they are already on a path of 
economic growth. Cohesion funds currently account for 4 per cent of GDP in the 
poorest countries and that is expected to rise to 10 per cent by 2013. In terms of 
employment, 2.5 million additional jobs are expected to be created (Hübner, 
2005). 
Set-up in 1957, the European Social Fund (ESF) represents the main 
financial instrument of the European Union to support economic and social 
cohesion, by reducing the differences in living standards across EU Members 
States and regions and by promoting employment in the EU. ‘The ESF's remit is 
to support measures which aim to prevent and combat unemployment, develop 
human resources and foster social integration in the labour market, so as to 
promote a high level of employment, equal opportunities for men and women, 
sustainable development and economic and social cohesion’.13  
The Commission report ‘European values in the globalised world’ in 2005, 
underlined that beside the positive effects of open trade, there is a need to assist 
those who are facing the negative outcomes of globalization through job losses. 
In order to support Member States governments to reintegrate workers into the 
labour market, President Barroso proposed the establishment of a Globalization 
Fund; the proposal was endorsed at the December 2005 European Council. The 
European Globalisation adjustment Fund (EGF) represents an innovative 
instrument aimed “to provide additional support for workers made redundant as a 
result of major structural changes in world trade patterns (...) Activation of the 
Fund should be subject to strict criteria relating to the scale of economic 
dislocation and its impact on local, regional or national economies” (European 
Council conclusions of December 2005). The novelty of EGF is the direct 
support offered to the workers who have been made redundant, and not the 
companies or institutions, through active labour market tools such as counselling, 
job search and mobility allowance, and micro-credits. However, the Fund will 
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 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60016.htm  
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apply only where the redundancies have a major impact on a region or sector, 
and ‘therefore there is an EU dimension in terms of scale and impact’ 
(MEMO/06/486).14 EGF is financed by unused community funds, and has been 
made available since January 2007, and is foreseen to be 500 million EUR per 
year. France was the first member state to apply for a contribution from the Fund, 
followed by the German and Finish governments.  
 
The Lisbon Agenda – response to globalisation 
 
Since 2000, the EU economic and social model has been increasingly 
reshaped by the ‘Lisbon agenda’ that has been endorsed at the highest political 
level. The Lisbon agenda aims to create a competitive knowledge society to 
achieve higher economic growth, increased competitiveness, and create more 
jobs. All of this is to be done without harming social cohesion or the 
environment. Thus, the EU model has been redefined to include high economic 
growth, and a high level of social and economic cohesion². This is Europe’s 
response to globalisation in order to make business and labour more competitive 
and better able to take advantage of the opportunities arising from globalisation. 
 
Prior to this, based on the new provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Luxembourg European Council in 1997 paved the way for the European 
Employment Strategy (EES), also known as the ‘Luxembourg process’. The EES 
is designed as the main tool to give direction to and ensure coordination of the 
employment policy priorities to which Member States should subscribe at EU 
level (European Employment Observatory). The Lisbon European Council in 
2000 set full employment as an overarching long-term goal for the new European 
economy.15 
 
The EES initiated a new working method at EU level – the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC). The OMC is based on five key elements: subsidiarity, 
                                               
14 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/486&format=HTML&aged=1&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en  
15
 Targets for employment rates for 2010 - 70% overall and 60% for women 
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convergence, management by objectives, country surveillance and an integrated 
approach. The main areas covered are employment, social inclusion, pension, 
health, research and innovation, and education and training. The policy goals of 
the OMC in the employment area are to increase the employment rates and to 
lower unemployment. EES aims at achieving better European convergence of 
national employment strategies, while respecting national diversity. The goal is 
to promote high employment rates, but not at any price (preserving quality of 
jobs, avoiding tax competition between countries).  
 
Cohesion policy is now the key instrument for achieving the objectives of 
the Lisbon agenda. The role of cohesion policy is to make countries and regions 
more attractive to investment, to promote innovation and to create more and 
better jobs. The reform of the structural funds has shifted financial support 
towards research and development, innovation, more and better jobs. Two thirds 
of the cohesion funds are now spent on the Lisbon objectives (Hübner, 2005). 
 
However, social groups are sceptical that the Lisbon strategy can effectively 
combine economic, social and environmental objectives in a mutually re-
enforcing way.16 They see the Lisbon strategy as ‘growth at all costs’ where 
economic growth is given priority over social objectives. They reject recent 
Commission statements that ‘growth automatically creates social cohesion’, 
which are based on purely quantitative calculations of GDP per capita. Costs 
generated by economic growth on social protection, public health and the 
environment are externalised from such calculations.  
 
The European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) together with the Social 
Platform of social NGOs, and the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) 
expressed their reservations to the European Council that the main emphasis of 
the Lisbon agenda was on the economic pillar of competitiveness and building an 
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 See Social Platform Resolution for European Council, 2005 
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internal market without barriers for business.17  They fear that ‘growth at all 
costs’ will undermine social objectives and decent working conditions in the EU. 
 
A recent European Parliament (EP) report shows how many European 
companies that benefited from EU structural funds later de-localised production 
to either Eastern Europe or Asia (Hutchinson, 2006). During the period 1995-
2001, 95,000 jobs were lost in France alone, making an average annual loss of 
13,500 jobs as a result of outsourcing to emerging market economies – especially 
to China which is the preferred destination (Aubert and Sillard, 2005). In the 
absence of any multilateral agreement binding multinational corporations, the EP 
report calls for a new international initiative on labour standards in the global 
economy. 
 
It is true that the European Commission has focussed strongly on economic 
growth - ‘the sick man’ of the Eurozone in recent years. Weak growth rates 
averaged around 1.5 per cent per annum between 2002 and 2005, but last year 
saw a marked improvement with growth at 2.7 per cent and projected 2.4 per 
cent for 2007.18 Critics argue, however, that the strict macroeconomic disciplines 
imposed by EMU have also contributed to low growth and high unemployment. 
The structural imbalance between the centralised powers of the EU in the field of 
economic integration compared to the de-centralised powers for labour and 
employment, which is left to national ‘action plans’ results in a negative trade-off 
between economic and social policy (Fitoussi and Laurent, 2006). There is, 
however, no agreement on a common strategy for reform of EMU to increase the 
social benefits. Even so, there appears to be a growing consensus that reforms are 
needed to allow countries greater fiscal leeway to deal with the needed structural 
reforms – especially as regards education and labour markets (Debrun and 
Pisani-Ferry, 2006). 
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 See Comments and Proposals for the 2006 Spring Council on the Lisbon Strategy, by ETUC, Social 
Platform and EEB. 
18
 See EU Annual Report on the Eurozone, 2007.  
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Intra-European free movement of persons and the portability of skills: 
recent developments 
 
In general, regional integration processes are mainly focused on economic 
issues, such as the establishment of free trade areas. As regards migration, the 
main purpose of regional agreements is the facilitation of the person’s 
movements on an intra-regional basis, as a condition to the further deepening 
economic integration. The system of free movement of persons between the EU 
Member States is certainly the most accomplished and documented example of 
such regional integration. However, the idea of free movement of persons and of 
facilitation of labour migration is not restricted solely to the EU, and progress in 
this way has been accomplished in the rest of Europe.19 
 
Free movement of persons represents one of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Community law and is a way of creating a European 
employment market and of establishing a more flexible and more efficient labour 
market (COM (2002) 649). However, one of the tension points between welfare 
states and the developing common market has arisen over regulations governing 
the mobility of labour across the jurisdictional boundaries of member states 
(Wallace, Wallace and Pollack, 2005). In order to facilitate the free movement of 
workers in the European labour market, the European Commission launched in 
1994 the European Employment Services (EURES). One of the aims of EURES 
is to provide information on living and working conditions, labour market 
policies and rights related to free movement of workers in all Member States.  
 
Migrant workers may face some problems regarding the recognition of the 
national qualifications. In this sense, the EU is particularly active in the area of 
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 Several European regional organisations have the objective to foster regional integration and have 
developed instruments to facilitate the movement of persons. In 1992, an Agreement on the free 
movement of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had already been signed. This cooperation 
in the CIS was deepened in 1994, when CIS Member States signed the Council of Europe’s Agreement 
on Cooperation in Labour Migration and Social Protection, even if the implementation phase seems to 
progress slowly. In 1998, an agreement was signed to combat irregular migration in the CIS. Moreover, 
in 2003, CIS countries elaborated a Draft Convention on the legal status of migrant workers and members 
of their families. In May 2001, the Eurasian Economic Community was also established with the aim to 
create a custom union and a common market between its Member States. Some provisions were then 
relative to the adoption of common guidelines concerning border security. 
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mutual recognition of qualifications. Mutual recognition is considered to be 
instrumental to the realisation of market integration. The EU has put the 
development of a European Qualifications Framework (EQF) at the top of its 
agenda (Copenhagen Declaration) (European Commission, 2002; Council of the 
European Union, 2002). In 2006, the European Commission took steps to 
advance this process by making a proposal for a recommendation of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the establishment of the European 
Qualifications Framework (European Commission, 2006a).  
 
This endeavour had gained momentum through the agreement of the 
European Education Ministers in 2005, on the occasion of a ministerial meeting 
in Bergen (Norway), to relate their project, the European Area for Higher 
Education, to the EQF. The conference in Bergen followed up a political process, 
which started in 1999 with a conference in Bologna where European ministers 
responsible for higher education signed the Bologna Declaration. The creation of 
the European Area for Higher Education lies at the centre of this process, which 
became known as Bologna process. This inter-ministerial process is member 
driven and is only partly related to the supranational oriented arrangements of the 
EU, which has little competence in the field of education. A major legal 
framework of the Bologna process is the UNESCO-Council of Europe joint 
convention on the recognition of higher education in the European Region 
adopted in 1997.20 As a result of the ministers’ decision in Bergen to relate their 
endeavour to the EQF, a European recognition regime has come into existence 
which includes different legal frameworks.  
 
An important tool designed to facilitate mutual recognition within the 
European region is the European Credit Point Transfer System (ECTS). Such 
credit systems, which are also widespread in the US and are increasingly being 
                                               
20
 To date, the Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the 
European Region (CETS No. 165) has been signed or acceded to by 46 countries of Western and Eastern 
Europe. But also Australia, Canada, the US, and Israel have signed the convention, though out of this 
group only Australia has so far ratified it. This joint convention of UNESCO and the Council of Europe is 
a revision of the Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas, and Degrees concerning Higher 
Education in the States belonging to the European Region, adopted at Paris, 21 December 1979 (UN 
Treaty Series No. 20966). 
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adopted in other countries, facilitate the comparison of different degrees. The 
establishment of formal quality assurance and accreditation systems has also 
become a major issue on the Bologna agenda. In 2005, the ministers agreed on 
establishing the European Register for quality assurance and accreditation 
agencies that meet European standards. These standards have been developed by 
the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA), 
and were adopted by the education ministers in the Bergen Communiqué on The 
European Higher Education Area - Achieving the Goals of 2005 (European 
Parliament and Council, 2006).21 The European Register is designed to ensure 
that quality assurance and accreditation agencies that are active in Europe meet 
certain standards. Hence, the Register establishes a kind of meta-control at the 
regional level, and aims at improving trust in the reliability of the information 
provided about the quality of degree awarding institutions. The European 
Register is, in other words, another instrument designed to facilitate mutual 
recognition of higher education qualifications. 
  
The EFQ has benefited from the standard-settings of the Bologna process in 
several ways. The ECTS has paved the way for the development of a transfer 
system of learning credits for vocational education and training, the European 
Credit Transfer System for Vocational Education and Training (ECVET) 
(European Commission, 2005a). The European Commission has also taken up 
the issue of quality assurance of the awarding institutions. In 2005 the 
Commission established a European Network on Quality Assurance in 
Vocational Education and Training similar to ENQA, which was established in 
2000 (European Commission, 2005b). Common standards for assessing and 
accrediting vocational training will further facilitate the comparability of 
certificates and awarding institutions.  
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 ENQA used to be a network, which was established in 2000 by the European Commission. In 
November 2004, the General Assembly transformed the Network into an association. For further 
information see www.enqa.eu 
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The importance of the EQF must be seen in the context of the General 
System Directives for professional recognition of the EU.22 Directives are strong 
instruments, as compliance with their requirements can be enforced through the 
European Court of Justice. Unless there is a substantial difference, the 
recognition Directives obliges EU member states to recognise the qualifications 
of other EU members for professional purposes. Hence, a member state is only 
allowed to require a compensation mechanism when the matters covered by the 
migrant's education and training differ substantially from those covered by the 
diploma required in the host Member State. As a result, the definition of 
substantial difference has become paramount when defining equivalence. The 
common classification system of the European Qualifications Framework, as 
well as common standards for quality assurance and accreditation, further specify 
what may count as substantial differences. These standards constrain 
significantly the reasons that may be given to justify a refusal. In short, the 
European recognition arrangements stand for a complex combination of 
instruments, which belong to different legal frameworks, such as UNESCO and 
the Council of Europe.  
 
The external dimension of economic and social coherence 
 
In its external policies, the EU works together with the multilateral 
institutions to improve global social policies. Since the publication of the 
WCSDG report in 2004, and the UN Summit on the follow up of the Millennium 
Development Goals, which endorsed it in 2005, the EU has further strengthened 
its external efforts to confront the formidable social challenges that globalisation 
presents for the millions that are excluded from its benefits.  
 
The EU does not seek to export its own social model or to promote 
harmonisation with its own social standards. In addition, together with the World 
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 The first general system Directive regulates the recognition of higher education diplomas awarded on 
completion of professional education and training of at least three years' duration (Directive 89/48/EEC). 
The second general system Directive for recognition, supplements the first by regulating the recognition 
of professional education and training of at least one-year’s duration, which is not covered by the first 
Directive (Directive 92/51/EEC). Finally, Directive 99/42/EC introduces a system for access to certain 
commercial, industrial or craft occupations that are not covered by the other two Directives. 
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Commission, it strictly refuses any sanctions-based approach to labour standards 
in international trade agreements (European Commission, 2004). Instead, it relies 
on the expectation that its external partners should uphold their multilateral 
obligations that they have undertaken. Almost all countries have ratified the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, the EU believes that all 
countries, whatever their level of economic development, should uphold their 
obligation to protect core labour standards (CLS) which are, in fact, universally 
recognised human rights. Moreover, the EU reserves its right to suspend 
development aid in cases of severe violation of human rights. 
 
The EU recognises that the incorporation of labour standards into free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with third countries or regional groupings is politically 
sensitive because developing countries fear that such provisions could be used  as 
a form of protectionism (Dasgupta, 2000). Therefore, the EU restricts its requests 
to respect for human rights, which include core labour standards. Since 1992, the 
EU has included a human rights clause in all agreements with third countries. 
The clause defines respect for human rights and democracy (as laid out in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights) as an “essential element,” and it applies 
to more than 120 countries today. “A violation of human rights may allow the 
EU to terminate the agreement or suspend its operation in whole or in part” (Der-
Chin, 2003).23  
 
Regarding non-core labour standards, the EU takes a more flexible 
approach and encourages countries to adopt those standards according to their 
socio-economic level of development. Many countries have already adopted 
multilateral obligations concerning ILO labour standards but frequently fall short 
of proper implementation in their domestic economies. To encourage better 
implementation and monitoring, the EU offers special incentives arrangements 
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 Critics such as MEP Richard Howitt point out a lack of enforcement and a double standard favouring 
economically important countries while criticizing smaller countries such as Myanmar/Burma. See also: 
http://www.eubusiness.com/Institutions/060515154807.135z74mw/sendto_form.  
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through its unilateral Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).24 The EU now 
aims to go beyond labour standards and to work towards the promotion of decent 
work, especially in developing countries. In 2006, the EU launched a new policy 
for decent work – meaning more and better jobs with welfare protection, equal 
opportunities and social dialogue – all of which can help developing countries to 
fight poverty (European Commission, 2006d). 
 
To conclude, the EU is now committed to improving economic and social 
coherence through its internal and external policies. It has moved beyond the 
traditional approach of labour standards to a broader understanding of social 
policy, which incorporates the qualitative aspects of decent work for all. 
Development aid should be targeted towards social and economic coherence as a 
means of reducing poverty. 
 
Towards a development-friendly investment regime: a role for the EU? 
 
In the EU, the member states are still competent to negotiate international 
investment treaties. The role of the EU, as a regional organisation, has therefore 
been very modest until now, at the same time as individual member states have 
continued their activism regarding BITs. A consequence of this split competence 
between the national and supranational level in the EU is that investment-related 
clauses in the European extra-regional FTAs are normally less comprehensive 
than the provisions in the BITs. Moreover, most of these FTAs explicitly refer to 
the BITs signed by EU member countries. A look at these investment-related 
clauses reveals the poor coverage of the issues usually covered by the BITs 
(Szepesi, 2004). Especially post-admission provisions and protection against 
expropriation are poorly represented, if not completely absent. Only in the Jordan 
agreement, a clause on national treatment can be found. The agreements with 
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 The EU system contains ‘special incentive arrangements’ which provides for greater tariff reduction. 
To be eligible for this scheme, it is not strictly necessary for countries to have ratified ILO conventions, it 
is sufficient if the country has incorporated the substance of the convention into its domestic legislation. 
The special incentive arrangements can be temporarily withdrawn by the EU in cases where compliance 
is lacking or insufficient monitoring occurs. However, the special incentive arrangements of the EU were 
unsuccessfully challenged by India in the WTO for being offered in a discriminatory way (WTO, 2004). 
It must be said, though, that India was more concerned by its loss of parity with trade competitors 
benefiting from the EU scheme, rather than challenging the substance of labour standards. 
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Mexico and Chile are somewhat more sophisticated than the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements (EURO-MED Agreements), revealing the important 
influence of the NAFTA model on the American continent. The post-admission 
provisions in these agreements are basically GATS compatible, rather than 
GATS plus. For the services sector, explicit reference is made to GATS 
commitments. The agreement with Chile is the first to extend national treatment 
to all non-service sectors, and is, in general, the most developed FTA in 
investment. Recently, the EU has discussed investment issues on behalf of the 
member states at the WTO, but the issues were not withheld in the Doha Round 
negotiations.  
 
On a different track, in its 2006 Communication on the ‘Implementation of 
the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (European Commission, 2006b), the 
Commission committed itself to continue to promote corporate social 
responsibility globally and refers explicitly to the UN Millennium Development 
Goals, the ILO Guidelines for MNEs, the OECD Guidelines (OECD, 2000), and 
the UN Global Compact. The Commission backs the launching of a European 
Alliance for Corporate Social Responsibility. The real impact of these efforts 
remains to be seen, however. 
 
The promotion of social dialogues in inter-regional relations 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the EU has started promoting a dialogue 
on social issues and the inclusion of human rights clauses in its inter-regional 
negotiations. During a speech at the ILO/European Commission forum on 
globalisation and employment in May 2005, the EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson argued that EU trade policy must have a social dimension. 
Mandelson went even further by stating that the EU uses trade policy to intensify 
good governance and good social practices through the General System of 
Preference (GSP) and the European Partnership Agreements in negotiations with 
the ACP regions. At the same time, EPAs have been at the centre of debate and 
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criticism from civil society and some international NGOs, accusing the EU of 
imposing its trade condition to weaker countries.  
 
The EU has developed two levels of inter-regionalism with Latin America. 
On the one hand, there is a general forum for dialogue between the EU and the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries (EU-LAC) and the EU and Latin 
America (the Rio group). On the other hand, the EU has some specific bi-
regional dialogues with MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and CARICOM. 
The first official summit between head of states and governments, between the 
EU and Latin America and the Caribbean took place in 1999 at Rio de Janeiro. 
The event ended with the declaration of intention of creating a ‘bi-regional 
strategic partnership’. During a second summit in Madrid in 2002, the areas of 
cooperation were clearly defined and a new commitment was made in order to 
strengthen institutions and social equity. Finally, the summit in Mexico in 2004 
at Guadalajara focused mainly on the problem of combining economic growth, 
social justice and poverty reduction. In Guadalajara, social cohesion became a 
common objective and an essential axe of the EU-LAC relations. The latest 
summit took place in Vienna in May 2006 were the EU-LAC commitments were 
renewed. Moreover, in Vienna it was decided to open negotiations for an 
Association Agreement with Central America and to initiate a process between 
the EU and the Andean Community to develop a future Association Agreement. 
In particular, and related to social issues, the final declaration in Vienna says: 
“We will continue to give social cohesion a high priority in our bi-regional 
cooperation and assistance programmes”. In terms of policy implementation, the 
EU has set some programmes of assistance such as “EUROsociAL” (2004), a 5 
years programme of 30 million euros that foresees assistance from the European 
Commission to Latin American Countries to develop and implement social 
policies. The programme aims at strengthening social cohesion through 
education, administration of justice and employment and taxation policies.  
 
Beside the forum EU-LAC, the EU has also established bi-regional relations 
with MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and CARICOM. Trade 
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Commissioner Peter Mandelson said that through the foreseen association 
agreements, the EU aims to foster a deeper partnership with both regions, based 
on the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance. In 2006 the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) has released an opinion25 on 
the EU-Andean Community relations. Section 5.5 - “The social content of the 
EU-Andean Community partnership” states that the agreement should contain a 
social chapter that could complement and counter-balance the one on trade and 
political dialogue. Moreover, the document stresses the importance of 
establishing technical cooperation and other assistance programme related to the 
promotion of social rights. 
 
In 2000, the EU and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states signed 
the Cotonou Agreement. The agreement sets a number of rules and allows for a 
number of privileges in the relations between the EU and the ACP group, such as 
market access, technical assistance etc. The Cotonou Agreement makes explicit 
reference to internationally recognised social rights, labour standards as those 
defined by the ILO and UN Conventions. Article 2 of the Agreement states the 
equality of the partnership and the support for participation and dialogue with 
civil society and economic and social partners. Article 9 lists a set of principles 
and political issues related to the respect of human and social rights and the 
importance of cooperation towards sustainable development. Moreover, article 
25 is entirely dedicated to social sector development and lists a set of priorities 
such as education, reinforcing health policies, gender equality etc. The problems 
today are related to the actual implementation of Cotonou. Under the Cotonou 
Framework, the parties agreed to negotiate separate sets of bilateral/regional 
treaties that would be focused on the specific realities of each region (West 
Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa etc). These Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) are due to be completed in 2008, but have been fiercely 
criticised by some international NGOs and some countries within the ACP 
groups as imposed unilaterally by the EU and as dangerous for the economic 
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 “Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on EU-Andean Community Relations” 
(2006/c 309/18) 
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reality of the developing countries. Another important problem related to the 
progress in the negotiations is the overlapping membership of regional actors in 
Africa. For example, six SADC member countries, which are members of 
COMESA as well, decided to negotiate as Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). In 
a document produced by the ACP-EU Follow-up Committee of the ECSC, some 
proposals have been made to improve the partnership in the preparation of the 
EPAs (EESC, 2006d). The document firstly assessed that still a lot needs to be 
done to effectively implement a social dimension within the Cotonou Agreement, 
and that social dialogue has a key role within the different regions’ sustainable 
development. Furthermore, it highlights the important link between trade and 
development, and it insists that development in ACP countries should go hand in 
hand with the eradication of poverty. Finally, the document affirms that EPAs 
should include a social dimension alongside trade and finance. 
 
In its relations with Asia, the main forms of ongoing inter-regional dialogue 
at the moment are the EU-ASEAN dialogue and the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM). The EU-ASEAN dialogue is carried out at Ministerial level and has 
been enhanced in recent years as consequence on the one hand of the economic 
crisis in Asia at the end of the 90’s, international terrorism and health concerns 
related to pandemic threats in Asia. In 2001 the European Commission published 
the document ‘Europe and Asia a Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnership’ in which it underlines the unique nature of the relations with Asia 
both from an economic point of view and a political one. The Cooperation 
between the EU and ASEAN dates back to 1980 and it is based on the Co-
operation Agreement. It is relevant to note that due to the nature of the 
Burma/Myanmar government, the EU has refused to sit in meetings with the 
latter and therefore Burma/Myanmar doesn’t participate to the EC-ASEAN 
meeting. In this particular case, the EU has shown to be an intransigent human 
rights promoter and the European Commission has stated that Myanmar could be 
the cause of the stall in the negotiations to establish a free-trade agreement with 
ASEAN. 
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The second form of inter-regional dialogue, ASEM aims at enhancing 
cooperation between the regions and promoting equal partnership. High-level 
meetings take place between heads of states and governments. The latest summit 
in September 2006, celebrating the tenth anniversary of ASEM, took the 
important decision to include additional countries (Bulgaria and Romania on the 
EU side - India, Mongolia, Pakistan and the ASEAN Secretariat on the Asian 
Side). This decision will change the shape of this regional forum, constituted 
now of 45 members and encompassing 60% of the world population. In the 
summit’s final declaration, 26  the ASEM leaders jointly underlined the link 
between economic development, social protection and sustainable development.  
 
 
3. The emergence of a social dimension of regional integration 
in the Americas: clash of models?  
 
The regionalisation process in the Americas is currently going through a 
phase of reconfiguration, characterised by rising tensions between new and old 
schemes and between different political views on the future of regional 
governance. The emergence of a new regionalist model in the 1990s, based on 
the NAFTA model, was seriously questioned and opposed when the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) was proposed by the US as a framework for the 
economic integration of the continent. As a counter-proposal, the Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) was launched by Venezuela, arguing 
precisely that the social and political dimensions of integration are as important 
as the economic dimensions and that regional integration should not be based on 
neo-liberal principles of liberalization and deregulation. 27  This alternative is 
currently developing as a hub and spoke scheme, lead by Venezuela, mostly 
based on bilateral commitments to cooperate in a number of policy areas, 
including education, health, culture and knowledge transfer.28 In between these 
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 Acuerdo entre el Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y el Presidente del Consejo de 
Estado de Cuba, para la aplicación de la Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas, La Habana, 14 
December, 2004. See also: www.alternativabolivariana.org. 
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 In June 2007, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela signed a Memorandum of Understanding to 
create the Bank of ALBA. 
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two contending models, the existing more institutionalised schemes in the 
different Latin-American sub-regions continue to further develop their policies 
and instruments and to take new initiatives in the socio-economic area, although 
the context in which they operate is one of institutional uncertainty. In this 
respect, at the Cuzco Summit in December 2004, the South American 
Community of Nations was launched, and later (in April 2007) re-named as 
Union of South-American Nations (UNASUR).  
 
In the following sections, recent trends and challenges related to the 
deepening of the social dimensions of these integration processes will be 
reviewed, followed by a discussion of the relevant aspects of the NAFTA model. 
In the area of social policies and social dialogue, the most relevant cases are the 
Andean Community and MERCOSUR. 29  The Central American Common 
Market (CACM) does not deal with labour rights, although civil society forums 
exist in which unions participate.  
 
Andean Community: important achievements, uncertain future 
 
The Andean Labour Advisory Council (ALAC) is an advisory institution of 
the Andean Integration System that is comprised of top-level delegates chosen 
directly by the representative organisations in the labour sectors of each of the 
member countries. The ALAC expresses opinions with regard to programs or 
activities of the Andean sub-regional integration process that are of its interest. 
Today, the ALAC is governed by Decisions 441 and 464, approved by the 
Andean Community Commission pursuant to the Guideline of the Andean 
Presidential Council ordering the attainment of "fuller participation" by this 
sector "in the construction of an integration process leading to the creation of a 
common market". In its first meeting, held on 3 December 1998, the ALAC 
adopted its by-laws, which established its composition and functions. Another 
important participative body is the Andean Business Advisory Council (CCEA) 
that is governed by Decisions 442 and 464 and is made up of representatives of 
employers’ organisations. In addition to the aforementioned participative forum, 
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the Andean Community has other instruments at its disposal, such as the Simón 
Rodríguez Agreement, which consists of a tripartite forum for debate, 
participation and coordination between labour ministers, employers and 
employees. This agreement was one of the first instruments of Andean social 
integration but in 1983, the agreement came to a standstill. On 24 June 2001, the 
Agreement took on its current format with the Protocol of Substitution of the 
Simón Rodríguez Agreement.  
 
The Labour Council is only consulted on an ad hoc basis and has relatively 
little influence on Andean Community decision-making. For some observers it 
“is merely a forum for debate”.30 Issues like safety and health in the workplace, 
labour migration, social security and capacity building are discussed but with 
little consequence. Labour rights are not covered, but there is a declaration 
regarding the protection of human rights. The Andean Community is nowadays 
working on the establishment of an Economic and Social Council (EESC, 2006c; 
ETUC, 2006a; Tizón, 2004) and on the Consultative Council of the Indigenous 
Peoples of the Andean Community. 
 
In the context of Latin America, the Andean Pact has played a pioneering 
role with respect to intra-regional migration. As soon as in 1973, an “Andean 
Migration Card” was launched following the adoption of the decision 397 of the 
Andean Group. Other decisions tending towards facilitating movement of 
persons have been adopted since by the Andean Community. In 2001, Decision 
503 on “recognition of national identification documents” recognizes the 
possession of a national identification document as the only requirement for 
travel, and Decision 504 created the Andean Passport by January 2005. Other 
instruments also deal with migration issues inside the region, such as the Andean 
Labour Migration instrument (Decision 545, 25 June 2003) and the Social 
Security instrument (decisions 546 and 583), or some instruments facilitating 
procedures, such as Decision 526 on “Airport incoming immigration formality 
booths for nationals and foreign residents of Member Countries”. Free movement 
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of persons is also seen as a precondition for the further implementation of the 
Andean Common Market. 
 
Decision 439 of the Andean Community of Nations on Services Trade, 
adopted in 1998 established a general framework of norms and standards with a 
view to liberalising trade in services in the Andean Community region (Dangond, 
2000). The Community is currently drafting a decision that will establish norms 
and standards aiming at facilitating the recognition of academic degrees and 
national requirements, in addition to professional diplomas. In more general 
terms, a number of government-to-government agreements and conventions for 
cultural cooperation have been established in Central and Latin America, which 
provide for the recognition of higher education qualifications. One well-known 
example is the Convenio Andrés Bello signed or acceded to by ten countries of 
Central and Latin America, and Spain. This framework, established in 1970, has 
become an important platform designed to improve communication and facilitate 
agreement between the education ministries. One important means is the list of 
equivalent degrees, designed to assist members in the comparison of higher 
education qualifications.  
 
In 2007, technical meetings were held to prepare the introduction of the 
“Andean Labour Card” in 2008. This mechanism should help the citizens of the 
Andean countries with respect to the mutual recognition of university titles, free 
movement of labour, labour rights, pensions and social security. 
 
MERCOSUR: a new social agenda 
 
In MERCOSUR it was only after trade union agitation, mainly from the 
Coordination of Trade Unions of the Southern Cone (CCSCS) that a working 
group (Subgroup 10) was set up in 1991 on ‘Labour relations, employment and 
social security’ (Newell and Tussie, 2006:48). This was done at the level of the 
Common Market Group, the executive organ of MERCOSUR. The subgroup 
provided a forum for discussion of labour issues and the development of 
recommendations to member states. For example, it has recommended that 
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governments ratify basic ILO conventions (Weeks, 2000). In 1994, the inclusion 
of a social charter was rejected but the Economic and Social Consultation Forum 
(FCES) was created, a tripartite structure for labour, business, and NGOs. Its 
recommendations, however, have no binding authority on the MERCOSUR 
governments.  
 
In 1998, the Social-Labour Declaration created a tripartite MERCOSUR 
Social-Labour Commission, consisting of twelve government, labour, and 
business members (da Motta Veiga and Lengyel, 2003). Governments annually 
submit a report on changes in national labour law and practice. The declaration 
covers core labour rights including migrant workers’ rights and commits the 
member countries to enforce their own labour laws. While these institutions 
conduct some useful work on minimum standard setting, they are advisory rather 
than enforcement institutions. In contrast to the freedom of movement guaranteed 
to investors, this is not very useful protection. The participatory and consultative 
mechanisms have given civil society actors a voice in the MERCOSUR 
integration process but there is no effective labour rights regime (Polanski, 
2004). 
 
MERCOSUR adopted in 2002 an Agreement on residence for nationals of 
MERCOSUR States, Bolivia and Chile, which grants temporary residence for a 
maximum of two years, then eventually transformed into permanent residence for 
citizens of Member States. The recognition regulation provided by the Protocol 
of Montevideo of MERCOSUR acknowledges the right of a member state to 
recognise the education, experience, licences, matriculation records, or 
certificates obtained in the territory of another member or any country that is not 
a member of MERCOSUR without requiring an extension to other MERCOSUR 
members. However, the signatory parties commit themselves to encourage the 
relevant bodies in their respective territories, including those of governmental 
nature, as well as professional associations and colleges, to develop mutually 
acceptable rules and criteria for the exercise of activities and to propose a 
recommendation on mutual recognition to the Common Market Group. The 
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parties have mandated the Commission to review the recommendation, and each 
party is requested to encourage the competent authorities to implement it. In 
1999 the Board of Architecture, Agronomy, Geology and Engineering 
Professional Entities for MERCOSUR Integration adopted a resolution on the 
temporary exercise of professional activities by foreign architects, agronomists, 
geologists, and engineers. A cross-sector initiative was launched by the ministers 
responsible for education in 2000 when they adopted the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the implementation of an experimental accreditation 
mechanism for the recognition of university degrees in the countries of 
MERCOSUR (MEXA). A Working Group of Specialists in Accreditation of 
Higher Education (GTEAE) was charged with the elaboration of both principles 
and procedures for such recognition, based on quality assurance through 
evaluation and accreditation processes. As with ENQA in the European context, 
a network for quality assurance agencies, the Iberoamerican Quality Network, 
has been established to facilitate the exchange of information and experiences 
amongst quality assurance and accreditation agencies.31 
 
At the 2004 Regional Employment Conference political leadership 
emphasised the need to give the issue of employment generation a more central 
place in regional and national public policies. A Declaration of MERCOSUR 
Labour Ministers called for the drafting of a Strategy of Employment Growth for 
MERCOSUR. For that purpose, the Council of the Common Market (CMC) 
created a High-Level Group (GANEmple) (CMC Decision 46/04). A draft 
proposal of such a strategy was approved at the Presidential Summit of Córdoba 
in July 2006, where the need to (re-)formulate and implement a social agenda for 
MERCOSUR was strongly emphasized. The strategy was based on two 
principles: (i) the generation of (decent) employment should be achieved through 
the articulation of macro-, meso- and micro-economic policies, on the one hand, 
and labour, social and educational policies, on the other; and (ii) all policies 
should be aimed at respecting and reaching labour rights and principles as 
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contained in the Social-Labour Declaration and in the ILO declaration on 
fundamental rights. The decision-making process takes place on two interrelated 
levels: regional and national. Technical assistance was initially provided by the 
MERCOSUR Labour Market Observatory, but the creation of the Social Institute 
of MERCOSUR, with a broader mandate, was prepared by a working group 
(GISM) at the level of the CMC, the political organ of MERCOSUR. This 
Institute is conceived as a body that should design, promote and implement 
regional social policies. The objectives of the Institute also include the 
construction of a harmonized system of social indicators. It is further foreseen 
that the decision-making procedures of MERCOSUR in the area of social 
policies will be adjusted in order to convert the intentions expressed at the 
Córdoba Summit into reality.  
 
Finally, through Decisions 45/04 and 18/05 of the CMC, the Fund for 
Structural Convergence of MERCOSUR (FOCEM) was created. This fund, 
which should particularly benefit the smaller member states (Uruguay and 
Paraguay), resembles in its objectives the European structural funds. FOCEM is 
still in its pilot phase, with the first projects approved in 2007. 
 
CARICOM: progress with respect to labour migration 
 
In the case of CARICOM, since 1997 the Charter of Civil Society recognizes 
fundamental labour rights. There is a mechanism for submitting complaints 
regarding labour rights violations but there are no sanctions. Consequently, as of 
yet there have been no complaints (Human Rights Watch, 2001). Trade unions 
are consulted on all trade matters through a formal mechanism and there is a 
policy of harmonisation of labour rights, e.g. regarding health and safety. 
 
The Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME) 
established a single open market and waived cross-border restrictions, as a way 
to facilitate the free movement of labour (articles 45 and 46). In January 2005, 
the CARICOM Passport had been launched, firstly by the Republic of Suriname. 
Following the launch of the CARICOM passport, another initiative, the OECS 
 42 
Passport, has been delayed and then abandoned. Another progress in CARICOM 
relates to less strict limitations on visa requirements to ensure hassle-free 
movements of visitors during the 2007 Cricket World Cup. Moreover, in January 
2006, the Central American Passport, designed and adopted by the four Members 
of the C-4 Treaty (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), became 
effective. All these events reflect progress in the cooperation between the 
countries of the region on the movement of persons. 
 
CARICOM member states agreed to set up or employ appropriate 
mechanisms to establish common standards to determine equivalency or accord 
accreditation to diplomas, certificates, and other evidence of qualifications 
secured by nationals of the other member states. Currently, university graduates, 
artists and musicians, sportspersons, media workers, managerial, supervisory and 
technical staff as well as the self-employed can move freely without work 
permits. In order to have their qualifications recognised, they must however 
obtain a Certificate of Recognition of CARICOM Skills Qualification, also 
called a CARICOM Skills Certificate, from their home or host country's ministry 
responsible for issuing skills certificates. 32  Since 2002 a Competency Based 
Education and Training model for vocational training has been developed by the 
Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD). The major effort to 
coordinate vocational training and education culminated in the Memorandum of 
Agreement between the Community members establishing the Caribbean 
Association of National Training Agencies (CANTA) in November 2003. 
CANTA has been given a mandate to establish a regional qualification 
framework. 33  This framework covers five levels of skill, responsibility, and 
autonomy and ties this to typical entry requirements, credits, and academic 
levels. To date, some 120 occupations have been recognised and certified under 
CANTA (CANTA Secretariat, 2005:37-38). 
 
Labour rights, investment rules and migration in the NAFTA model 
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The new generation trade agreements in the Americas have mostly been 
modelled on the US-Canada FTA and NAFTA (De Lombaerde and Garay, 
2006). In terms of labour rights, three periods can be distinguished regarding US 
policy. First, the NAFTA labour side agreement (North American Agreement on 
Labour Cooperation - NAALC) was negotiated with Canada and Mexico, 
designed chiefly to appease the US labour movement, which, however, continued 
to oppose NAFTA. Subsequently, one demand of labour rights advocates was 
that provisions needed to be in the body of the agreement and enforceable like 
commercial provisions. Second, the Clinton administration negotiated different 
versions of labour rights provisions in the body of several trade agreements – a 
period of innovation and experimentation. Third, following renewal of fast track 
authority, the Bush administration pursued a standardised approach of 
negotiating labour chapters in all its trade agreements. There are some important 
similarities across the three periods:  
1)  In every case, the US administration introduced the labour rights issue in 
international negotiations, reflecting domestic politics. 
2)  The key commitment is always the enforcement of existing national labour 
law (in addition, non-derogation clauses are absent or weak, allowing for 
discretionary weakening of national standards), indicating the limited 
interest of the respective US administration in international commitments. 
3)  Cumbersome processes lead to sanctions, making such sanctions highly 
unlikely.  
 
Most agreements passed Congress against the opposition of the US labour 
movement; the exception was the 2001 US-Jordan FTA. Unions in the US 
disagree with the fundamental assumption behind the focus on the enforcement 
of domestic labour law, namely that “the national legislation of the three 
countries incorporates the core principles, while the right to observe them varies 
according to the countries’ level of development and is not due to a deliberate 
effort to avoid compliance” (Martinéz, 2004:15). 
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Of all the FTAs with labour rights provisions – with the obvious exception 
of the EU – the 1994 NAFTA is the only one that has a long enough record to 
allow an analysis of its effectiveness. The NAFTA labour side agreement (North 
American Agreement on Labour Cooperation) enumerates eleven basic labour 
principles but essentially only commits the parties to the enforcement of their 
existing national labour law: “Each party shall promote compliance with and 
effectively enforce its labour law through appropriate government 
action.”(NAALC, 1993, Art. 3). In fact, there is not even an explicit prohibition 
regarding the weakening of labour law for the parties to the NAALC: Article 3 of 
the NAALC recognizes “the right of each Party to establish its own domestic 
labour standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly its labour laws and 
regulations.” (NAALC, 1993). Actual enforcement provisions entail a three-
tiered structure that precludes sanctions or fines outside child labour, minimum 
employment standards and occupational health and safety. In cases involving 
freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively, arguably the most 
important of the core rights, the enforcement ends with ministerial consultations 
between the labour ministers.  
 
The NAALC created a Commission of Labour Cooperation (CLC), 
consisting of a ministerial council (the three labour ministers) and a secretariat, 
which deals mostly with cooperative endeavours and studies. The NAALC also 
set up an institutional structure to deal with complaints regarding non-
enforcement of domestic labour law (“submissions”). So called National 
Administrative Offices (NAO) in each signatory’s labour department receive and 
process submissions from civil society concerning non-enforcement of labour 
law in either of the two other countries. These submissions are not limited to 
matters affecting trade. The NAOs are obligated to provide information if 
requested from any of the other NAOs.  Based on its review, the NAO can then 
request ministerial consultations. If these do not resolve the issue, there is no 
further action on problems involving freedom of association, the right to bargain 
collectively, or the right to strike. For all others, a three-person evaluation 
committee of experts (ECE) can be appointed, which will develop a report for 
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review of the ministerial council, including recommendations to improve 
compliance. A five-member arbitration tribunal can be appointed. In case of child 
labour, minimum employment standards and occupational safety and health, a 
“persistent pattern of non-enforcement” can ultimately result in monetary 
assessments (fines) – which will be paid into a fund to improve enforcement of 
labour law in the offending country) – or, if the fines are not paid, trade 
sanctions. Finally, each member state has also established a national advisory 
committee (NAC), composed of employer, labour and government 
representatives (Banks, 2002: 196).  
 
Most studies of the NAALC come to negative conclusions as far as the 
tangible practical and legal results of the submissions are concerned (Ayres, 
2004). Most submissions were filed before 2000 (most affecting Mexico, but 
several also addressing labour rights violations in the US); since then there has 
been a “submission fatigue,” probably due to a “disappointment trap” (Dombois 
et al., 2003). If unions and NGOs stop using it because it is too expensive and 
ineffective, cooperative activities may also end altogether. Submissions, 
however, can be a useful tool, among others, to gain some political space.  
 
The participatory elements and regional focus of NAALC have led to the 
development, or strengthening, of transnational networks of unions and human 
rights organisations and have provided greater publicity than ILO complaints. 
Few had foreseen such cross border union cooperation in the context of an 
agreement perceived as directed solely against Mexico.34 
 
With the exception of the innovative textile agreement with Cambodia, 
negotiated by the Clinton administration in 1999, bilateral and regional FTAs 
after the NAALC have always focused their labour rights provisions on the 
enforcement of existing national labour law (the so called “Jordan formula”). 
Thus, to a certain extent they depart from the commitment to “internationally 
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recognized labour rights” embodied in the various unilateral labour rights 
provisions in US trade law.35 
 
While the project of a FTAA seems gridlocked indefinitely – with labour 
rights being only a secondary issue of contention – the US has continued on its 
course of negotiating bilateral and regional FTAs. These are explicitly part of a 
strategy of “competitive liberalisation” and thus aim to go beyond the WTO 
status quo on tariffs and non-tariff issues such as investment rules and 
intellectual property rights. Domestic US politics, however, have forced labour 
rights on the agenda. The 2002 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) limits the time 
Congress can debate a trade agreement negotiated by the president and allows 
only for an up-or-down vote, but this “fast track” came at a price: It obligates the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to “promote respect for worker 
rights (…) consistent with core labour standards of the ILO” (Sec. 2102(a)(6)). In 
section 2102(b)(12)(G), the TPA instructs negotiators to seek provisions that 
“treat United States principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to (i) the 
ability to resort to dispute settlement under the applicable agreement; (ii) the 
availability of equivalent dispute settlement procedures; and (iii) the availability 
of equivalent remedies.” However, the so called “no retaliation” clause, added to 
the TPA at the last minute, states that “no retaliation may be authorized” when a 
party fails to enforce its law based on an exercise of discretion, e.g., regarding 
the allocation of resources. The TPA expired on May 31, 2007. 
 
After negotiating several bilateral FTAs, the US concluded an inter-regional 
FTA with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the 
Dominican Republic.36 Its labour chapter is essentially the same as in the US-
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Chile and US-Singapore trade agreements. It includes labour rights provisions in 
the body of the agreement. The parties guarantee that they will enforce their 
domestic labour laws. Non-enforcement can lead to “monetary assessments” (i.e., 
fines) or trade sanctions, provided it affects trade. Parties will also “strive to 
ensure” that they will not weaken labour laws in a manner affecting trade. In 
addition, parties reaffirm their commitment to the labour rights entailed in the 
1998 ILO Declaration. These latter provisions, however, are non-enforceable, as 
disputes, arising under them cannot be brought to dispute resolution. The 
agreement also includes provisions regarding cooperative endeavours on labour 
issues. 
 
DR-CAFTA does go beyond the Chile and Singapore bilateral agreements 
in two respects: There will be cooperation with the ILO to improve existing 
labour laws, and US-assisted building of local capacity to improve labour law 
compliance (Labour Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism) (USTR, 
2004). Funding issues, however, are unresolved. The FTA was highly 
controversial in the US, in part because Congressional Democrats considered a 
commitment to enforce domestic labour law as insufficient. Central American 
trade ministers reacted to this situation by announcing the creation of a working 
group that identified areas where labour law reform and improved compliance 
were needed. As is often the case, there was considerable leverage to improve the 
labour rights situation before the agreement was passed. There may be little 
leverage left, however, once it is in place. 
 
Since 1994, Canada has been using the NAALC as a model in its FTAs with 
Chile and Costa Rica, focusing on the effective enforcement of domestic labour 
law (there is only the standard reference to prison labour in the Canada-Israel 
FTA; Human Rights Watch, 2001; Salazar-Xirinachs, 2001). There will be 
labour side agreements to its FTA with Singapore as well as a Central America 
Four Agreement on Labour Cooperation, parallel to the Canada-Central America 
Four FTA. 
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Moving now from trade to investment, chapter 11 of NAFTA is considered 
(and also criticized) as a model for many of the new generation comprehensive 
and detailed investment rules at the regional level. Its characteristics are best 
identified when compared to, for example, European FTAs and/or BITs. The 
NAFTA agreement goes further in at least four areas: (i) its scope of application 
is quite wide and is not restricted to FDI; it also includes equity and debt 
security, debt finance, and real estate; (ii) post-admission provisions (national 
treatment and MFN principles) are GATS plus; (iii) strong investment protection 
provisions are foreseen, including reference to indirect expropriation; (iv) 
investor-to-state dispute settlement is foreseen under ICSID or following 
UNCITRAL rules (Szepesi, 2004). Typical for the US model is the fact that, 
contrary to the European model, investment clauses in FTAs were a direct 
application of its BIT model or went even further (Reiter, 2006).37  
 
With respect to the movement of persons, NAFTA, signed in 1994, and 
NAALC contain provisions for a facilitated movement of persons, which is 
conceived as a way to further develop a regional free trade area. However, 
referring to Chapters 12 and 16 of the NAFTA, there is no general freedom of 
movement, as these regional instruments organize a temporary entry only for 
certain categories of persons, that is for business persons and persons in relation 
to the provision of service. The Trade NAFTA (TN) visa also aims at facilitating 
the movement of professionals, by allowing admission for a renewable period of 
one year. 
 
The parties to NAFTA agreed to ensure that measures relating to 
qualification, requirements, and procedures, as well as technical standards and 
licensing requirements should not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in 
services (Pinera González, 2000). However, in contrast to the EU, NAFTA does 
                                               
37
 The US-FTAs that followed NAFTA applied the same model, more or less literally (Akpan, 2005). 
Applications of the US/NAFTA model to third country agreements include the ASEAN Investment Area 
(ARIA) of 1998, the agreements signed by Japan with Singapore (2002), Korea (2002) and Mexico 
(2004). Mexico and Chile have played a role as secondary hubs in the diffusion of the US/NAFTA model 
(Reiter, 2006). 
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not require the parties to recognise experience, licences or certifications obtained 
in the territory of another party or a non-party. It only acknowledges the right of 
a member to recognise qualifications similar to the MERCOSUR provisions 
(NAFTA Art.1210.2). As a consequence, the NAFTA provision for recognition 
of qualifications provides for unilateral, bilateral, or pluri-lateral recognition 
arrangements. NAFTA aims at strengthening these arrangements by providing a 
platform for the development of recommendations on recognition standards. 
These standards may include the accreditation of schools and academic 
programmes, as well as a specification of the length and nature of experience 
required for licensing, and of continuing education and ongoing requirements to 
maintain professional certifications. To date, such recommendations have been 
established for engineering and legal services. No regional qualifications 
framework has been developed so far between the NAFTA parties. Notably in 
the US, a self-regulated and market-based approach prevails. Companies or 
associations offer certification and educational testing of skills and competence. 
In certain sectors, non-governmental organisations have been assigned the task of 
establishing national standards e.g. the National Institute for Metalworking Skills 
(NIMS). Such an approach encourages workers to certify their skills and 
employers to recognise such certifications. Some companies and associations 
have started to provide their certification services across borders. A similar trend 
can be observed in the field of higher education, where accreditation agencies 
offer programme accreditation to higher education institutions in other countries 
(Eaton, 2002). In the field of regulated professions mutual recognition 
agreements of professional associations play a crucial role in facilitating cross-
border recognition of professional qualifications. The Inter-recognition 
Agreement between the Committee of Canadian Architectural Councils (CCAC) 
and the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB), for 
instance,  permits Canadian and US architects whose provinces/states are 
signatory to the Agreement to be eligible to be licensed in a jurisdiction that is 
also signatory. 34 US states and 7 Canadian provinces have signed this 
recognition agreement so far. 
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4. Africa: building blocks for regional social governance 
 
The African continent counts a considerable number of regional integration 
initiatives. However, their results are often considered as disappointing because 
of a lack of structural stability (peace and security) and inadequate institutional 
designs (van Ginkel, Court and Van Langenhove, 2003; Kennes, 2003). Multiple 
overlapping memberships are also considered as one of the factors that 
complicate regional governance in Africa (UNECA, 2006). 
 
In the following paragraphs, we focus on recent developments in two areas: 
regional social dialogue, and intra-regional labour migration. 
 
A new framework for regional social dialogue 
 
Social dialogue represents an important tool in strengthening the social 
dimension of Africa’s engagement in the global economy. Generally speaking, 
the relations between African civil society organisations (CSOs) and 
governments have often been rather distant, of marginal importance, problematic 
and/or conflictuous (Bayart, 1986; Fatton, 1995; Monga, 1995). Civil society 
participation in Africa addresses mainly issues of peace and security (Murithi, 
2005) and pandemic diseases like HIV/AIDS (EESC, 2006b). However, efforts 
to establish a more institutionalised partnership between politicians and civil 
society at the regional level were actually initiated during the transformation of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). In 2001 
and 2002, the OAU organised two OAU-Civil Society Conferences (Murithi, 
2005:116-118). 
 
Three important initiatives call attention to the importance of integration of 
employment and decent work into the African political and civil agendas. A first 
step was made at the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the OAU, which was organized in Lusaka, Zambia in July 
2001, when it was decided that a Ministerial Meeting on Employment Promotion 
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and Poverty Reduction in Africa would be organized.38 Consequently, in April 
2002 in Burkina Faso, a meeting of the OAU’s tripartite Labour and Social 
Affairs Commission was organized, where member States acknowledged the 
importance of job creation in Africa. Moreover, at the Second Summit in July 
2003, in Maputo, Mozambique, the Assembly of African Heads of State and 
Government decided39 to organize an Extraordinary Summit on Employment and 
Poverty Alleviation in 2004. All the AU Member States were invited to attend 
the Summit and the AU Commission was asked to organize it, in collaboration 
with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the ILO and other Partners 
and Stakeholders. The Summit took place in September 2004 in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso and the result was a Declaration, a Plan of Action and a Follow-up 
Mechanism for the promotion of employment and poverty alleviation. 
 
The topic of the Extraordinary Summit on Employment and Poverty 
Alleviation in Africa was “Strategies for Employment Creation and Enhancing 
Sustainable Livelihoods”. One of the most important meetings was the African 
Social Partners’ Forum, on the theme “Decent Work: a Driving force for Africa’s 
Development”, which represented the first assembly of the representatives of 
African workers and employers’ organization as social partners. The promotion 
of a tripartite social dialogue and decent work were the main topics on the 
agenda. The social partners agreed on the fact that “the vitality of social dialogue 
is depending on strong, autonomous and representative partners and institutions 
of social dialogue”. 40 
 
The background paper prepared by the AU Commission, highlighted that 
the main objectives of the Summit should be to: (i) significantly raise the level 
and increase the growth rate of productive employment in all sector of the 
economy, (ii) to promote increased and decent employment opportunities 
throughout the economy with adequate social protection and respect for core 
                                               
38
 Decision AHG/Dec.166 (XXXVII) 
39
 Decision: Assembly/AU/Dec.20 (II)  
40
 Conclusions of the African Social Partners’ Forum 
http://www.africaunion.org/EMPLOYMENT/Conclusion%20Social%20partners%20en.pdf 
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labour standards, (iii) to strengthen participation and voice. In the same line, the 
expected outcomes of the Summit were among others: (i) better institutional 
arrangements and capacity for delivering employment programmes and poverty 
alleviation interventions, (ii) partnership and greater participation by all 
stakeholders and integrated approach in designing and implementing 
programmes to combat poverty and unemployment (EXT/ASSEMBLY/AU/2 
(III)). 
 
In the Declaration on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa, the 
Heads of State and Government of the AU acknowledged the importance of 
strengthening “social dialogue mechanisms and institutions as a means of 
realizing participatory democracy involving the social partners and civil society 
in policy making, implementation, evaluation, and monitoring” 
(EXT/ASSEMBLY/AU/3 (III)). In order to promote productive employment and 
poverty alleviation, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and 
the Labour and Social Affairs Commission of the AU have become the principal 
fora for discussion and partnership between Governments, social partners and 
civil society. Additionally, they are devoted to support the ongoing efforts of the 
Governments, social partners and civil society organizations to promote the 
decent work development agenda of the ILO. Furthermore, the Heads of State 
and Government committed themselves to boost the role of RECs in their attempt 
to promote a productive employment dimension into the regional and inter-
regional cooperation agenda. An important asset is the designation of the 
Member States and RECs41 as main implementation bodies of the Plan of Action 
and Declaration, and the AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission is delegated 
to coordinate the implementing mechanisms. The first comprehensive Evaluation 
Reports are expected to be presented in 2009 and 2014.  
 
The Third Extraordinary Session on Employment and Poverty Alleviation 
reinforced the roles of the RECs and ECOSOCC of the AU. Based on the 
                                               
41
 Eight RECs are accredited to the AU: ECOWAS, COMESA, ECCAS, SADC, AMU, IGAD, CEN-
SAD, EAC (First Conference of African Ministers of Economic Integration in March 2006, 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, CAMEI/Consol. Report (I)) 
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provisions of the Articles 5 and 22 of the Constitutive Act of the AU, ECOSOCC 
is designed as an advisory body composed of different social and professional 
groups of the member states of the Union. ECOSOCC is meant to give effect to 
the principle of participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union 
(Art. 4(c)) and recognition of the need to build a partnership between 
governments and all segments of civil society (Preamble). After some 
organisational delay (Sturman and Cilliers, 2003) ECOSOCC was installed by 
the Third Ordinary Session of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa, between 
6 to 8 July 2004, deciding to adopt the Draft Statutes of ECOSOCC42  and 
requested the Chairperson of the Commission to take urgent measures to launch 
and operationalize ECOSOCC. The 2004 Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari 
Maathai from Kenya was elected the first president. The composition of 
ECOSOCC includes social groups, professional groups, non-governmental 
organisations and cultural organisations. ECOSOCC’s structure includes a 
General Assembly, a Standing Committee, 10 Sectoral Cluster Communities43 
and a Credentials Committee. It is still too early to evaluate these initiatives at 
the continental level. 
 
Prior to these initiatives, at the 37th Summit of the OAU in July 2001, the 
African leaders launched the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD). NEPAD is designed to address the current challenges facing the 
African continent and its core objectives are “to eradicate poverty and to place 
African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development”. However, 
even if the main purpose of NEPAD is poverty mitigation, there was no explicit 
mention of employment promotion. In this context, the Plan of Action for 
Promotion of Employment and Poverty Alleviation of the Ouagadougou Summit 
in 2004, promote employment as the core element of NEPAD’s priorities. In 
addition, employment creation and poverty alleviation should be used as 
indicators in the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism. Furthermore, the 
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 Assembly/AU/Dec.42 (III) 
43
 1) Peace and Security 2) Political Affairs 3) Infrastructure and Energy 4) Social Affairs and Health 5) 
Human Resources, Science and Technology 6) Trade and Industry 7) Rural Economy and Agriculture 8) 
Economic Affairs 9) Women and Gender and 10) Cross-cutting Programmes. 
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SADC Ministerial Meeting - “Towards an African Regional Social Policy” - in 
Johannesburg in 2006 underlined that NEPAD Action Plans have to expand its 
areas by adding decent employment and social integration in order to ensure 
African social development.  
 
Several steps have been taken to set-up social dialogues at the sub-
continental (regional) level. The original ECOWAS Treaty included, as it does 
today, a Social and Cultural Affairs Commission designed to “provide a forum 
for consultation generally on social and cultural matters affecting the member 
states” (Art. 49). Article 82 of the Revised Treaty represents a step forward by 
explicit referring to workers and employers among those whose involvement in 
the integration process should be encouraged. However, the Revised Treaty 
makes no specification on how the social partners would be formally consulted 
(Robert, 2004). In 2001, the representatives of the member states signed the 
ECOWAS Protocol of Democracy and Good Governance. Article 28 stipulates 
that social dialogue should be promoted by the member states and that 
“employers associations and workers unions shall meet regularly among 
themselves and with political and administrative authorities with a view to 
preventing social conflict” (ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance (ECOWAS, 2001)).  
 
In order to institutionalize the dialogue between Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) and ECOWAS, in December 2003 the West African Civil Society Forum 
(WACSOF) was created. WACSOF was designed to have the role of an advisory 
body and partner of ECOWAS. At the 2nd Annual Meeting of WACSOF held in 
Accra, Ghana in 2005, the representatives of West African Civil Society 
recommended that “ECOWAS member states, in negotiating and signing 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), should do so in consultation with 
expertise within civil society, as available within WACSOF, and avail 
themselves of their expertise and perspectives”. 44  However, issues related to 
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 Communiqué of the 2nd West African Civil Society Forum, 2005. 
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employment and labour standards are not covered by WACSOF. Due to financial 
constraints, WACSOF’s agenda in 2006 was restricted to two major topics: 
Democracy and Good Governance, and Peace and Security. 
 
The Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council (SATUCC), a 
sub-regional labour organisation, is involved in SADC since its creation in 1983. 
The main scope of SATUCC is to establish a regional trade union movement that 
would influence SADC policies at regional and national levels. In 1995, the 
Council of Minister established the SADC Employment and Labour Sector, 
based on a tripartite structure, including representatives from the government, 
business, and trade unions in the region. However, until then SATUCC was 
engaged in SADC through the Southern African Labour Commission. The 
Extraordinary Summit in 2001 agreed on a new structure for SADC institutions, 
and therefore, the Employment and Labour Sector was included in the Social and 
Human Development Programme. Although SATUCC is considered as “the 
strongest regional voice calling for regional cooperation”, its capability to 
establish a tri-partite role in SADC is limited. This limitation is due to the fact 
that even if SADC is structured as a supra-national body it does not have binding 
law-making powers and controlling judicial institution (LRS Research Report, 
2004). Nevertheless, the main achievement of SATUCC is the development of a 
social Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers in Southern Africa, which is 
ratified by nearly all SADC countries. 
 
In the East African Community, there is a sub-regional trade union 
organisation, the East African Trade Union Council (EATUC), which promotes 
labour issues, including the ratification of international labour standards by the 
member states and the harmonization of labour law. 
 
Regarding promotion of social dialogue within CEMAC, the tripartite 
seminar held in Bangui in September 2000, attended by the labour ministers, 
should be mentioned. One of the most important outcomes of the seminar is the 
recommendation to create a CEMAC tripartite social commission. It was also 
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decided that the social and economic dimensions should have the same 
importance in formulating development policies. 45  Subsequently, the second 
tripartite meeting was held in 2003 aiming at analyzing the possibility of creating 
a permanent social dialogue structure within CEMAC and discuss further steps in 
promoting social dialogue in the sub-region. As a result of these two meetings, in 
2006 the Council of Ministers adopted a set of rules on the creation, the 
composition and the functioning of the sub-regional Tripartite Social Dialogue 
Committee. 46  The main attributions of the new tripartite Committee are the 
reinforcement of social dialogue within CEMAC, free movement of workers and 
fundamental principals and rights at work (Art. 4). Furthermore, Art. 6 stipulates 
that the main mission of the Committee is to contribute to the consolidation of 
the process of social negotiation with a view to prevent and manage social 
conflicts. The Committee, which comprises the ministries of labour of the 
member states, as well as representatives of the employers and workers 
organizations, meet on an annual basis. The decisions and recommendations 
issued by the Committee are adopted by consensus (Art.9).  
 
A significant role in promoting social dialogue at the regional level is 
played by the ILO, which under its PRODIAF programme contributed to the 
creation of the Tripartite Social Dialogue Committee (CEMAC) and the Labour 
and Social Dialogue Council (WAEMU). An ILO-PRODIAF programme started 
in 1998, financed by the Belgian government. During the first phase, (1998-
2003) PRODIAF activities included 21 national studies on the state of social 
dialogue and tripartite cooperation, as well as assistance in four sub-regional 
tripartite meetings. The adoption of the declaration of Ouagadougou regarding 
the strengthening of social dialogue at the sub-regional level of the WAEMU in 
1999 and the tripartite meetings of CEMAC are considerable results of the 
PRODIAF programme. Consequently, in its second phase, PRODIAF 
encouraged the creation of a network of social dialogue experts for the French 
speaking countries of Central Africa and the Great Lakes region. The meeting 
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 http://www.ilo.org/public/french/region/afpro/abidjan/publ/oit11/social8.pdf 
46
 Règlement n° 13/06-UEAC-083-CM-14 
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held in Kigali in May 2005 gathered numerous participants and they expressed 
the need to strengthen the capacity of government officials as well as of social 
partners to mediate in labour disputes.  
 
Further steps in support of labour migration 
 
Since 1975 and the Lagos Treaty establishing the ECOWAS, one of the 
aims of this regional organisation has been the removal of obstacles to free 
movement of people (preamble and article 27). This idea was further pursued in 
1979 with the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of persons and the right of 
residence and establishment, but also, in 1992, with the revision of the Treaty of 
the ECOWAS. ECOWAS launched an ECOWAS passport in 2000, to be used 
alongside the ECOWAS Travel Certificate. In 1991 still, the Abuja Treaty 
launched the African Economic Community, a regional institution aiming at 
promoting the intra-regional free mobility of labour, as indicated in its article 43 
on “free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment”. Later, in 
December 2001, the ECOWAS adopted a Political Declaration and an Action 
Plan against Trafficking. 
 
Within UEMOA the free movement of persons, rights of residence and 
establishment are fully harmonized with those of ECOWAS. Furthermore, the 
member countries have abolished entry visa requirements.  
 
CEMAC has taken the initiative to harmonize the labour codes of the 
member states in order to allow its citizens to work in another member state, after 
obtaining a valid contract and work permit. In 2000, a CEMAC passport has 
been introduced with the responsibility for delivering and administrating it 
resting with the individual member states. Additionally, in order to develop a 
common standard of training and education for its labour force, CEMAC 
encouraged the creation of community-sponsored training institutions in different 
member states (ECA, 2007). 
 
 58 
The SADC Windhoek Treaty of 1992 also contains provisions for the 
movement of people across borders. In the SADC region, in 1994, visa 
requirements were abolished for travel of SADC citizens inside the region, and 
then, in 1997, negotiations were launched on a Draft protocol on the facilitation 
of movement of persons in the SADC. The protocol was finally signed in 
Gaborone in August 2005. 
 
Member states of SADC signed the Protocol on Education and Training in 
September 1997, and this came into force in 2000. In the Protocol, the member 
states agreed to “take all steps possible to act together as a Community, in the 
gradual implementation of equivalence, harmonisation and standardisation of 
their education and training systems under this Protocol”.47  As part of the 
implementation strategy the Technical Committee on Certification and 
Accreditation (TCCA) was established in 1997, with a view to developing policy 
guidelines, instruments and procedures to achieve the goals set out in the 
protocol. Since 2001 major efforts have been undertaken to develop standards 
and a classification system for national qualification systems that will make it 
possible to link them to a regional qualifications framework, in order to improve 
the understanding of the systems in other countries. Such a mechanism would 
permit comparisons between entry requirements, curricula, and exit 
qualifications (Samuels, 2003). The project seeks simultaneously to pool efforts 
to improve the general standards of skills, knowledge, and values. In June 2005, 
the recently established Integrated Committee of Ministers approved the SADC 
Qualifications Framework concept paper which provides guidelines and a 
proposed implementation plan for the development of such a framework. So far, 
national qualifications frameworks have been established mainly in South Africa 
and Namibia.48  
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 See Protocol on Education and Training Article 2h,  
www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/protocols/education_and_training.php  
48
 For an overview of the national qualifications framework in South Africa, see www.saqa.org.za, and 
for Namibia see Gertze (2005). 
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The development of regional qualifications frameworks for regulated 
professions has also become a topic of the agenda. The Eastern, Central and 
Southern Africa College of Nursing (ECSACON) has developed a prototype of a 
Profession Qualification Framework (PRF) that is designed to help countries of 
the region to develop their country-specific PRF documents. The framework 
addresses the scopes of practice standards, competencies, and the core content 
and standards for education. Four countries have so far developed their own 
documents – Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, and Zambia (Ward, et al. 2005).  
 
The revision of the UNESCO convention on the recognition of higher 
education for the African states, originally adopted in 1981, has attracted interest 
in recent years. 49  The African education ministers amended the regional 
convention on the occasion of the 8th conference of African Education Ministers 
(MINEDAF VIII) in Dar es Salaam on 6 December 2002 (UNESCO, 2004:8).50  
A major point of reference for the revision is the new UNESCO Convention on 
the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European 
Region. The African ministers have also declared interest in developing a credit 
point system similar to the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) (UNESCO, 
2004:5). The issue of quality assurance as a means for facilitating mutually 
recognition has also moved to the top of the agenda of the African higher 
education sector. The Association of African Universities, a forum of African 
higher education institutions, has initiated programmes designed to foster quality 
assurance systems in African universities.  
 
 
5. Asia: towards a community of caring societies?  
 
Generally speaking, formal regional integration is less developed in Asia 
and the Pacific than in other parts of the world. The initiatives tend to be more 
based on inter-governmentalism and to be less political. In the following 
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 The Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Certificates, Diplomas, Degrees and other 
Academic Qualifications in Higher Education in the African States, adopted at Arusha on 5 December 
1981 (UN Treaty Series No. 21522). 
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 See also UNESCO news release: UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of African Member 
States, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2-6 December 2002, www.col.org/colweb/site/pid/3656 
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paragraphs, we will review the case of the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and also refer to the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), and Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC). 
 
Labour rights do not feature prominently on ASEAN’s agenda, but the 
ASEAN Trade Union Council (ATUC) is pushing for a social charter and a 
framework for the protection of migrant workers.51 There are policy dialogues 
that include labour issues at various levels. The ASEAN Senior Labour Officials 
meet since 1975. This meeting has been discussing the ratification of ILO 
conventions, the ASEAN Occupational Safety and Health Network (ASEAN-
OSHNET) established in 2000 (to which the People’s Republic of China, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea – ASEAN Plus Three – have been invited), and the 
ASEAN-Japan Program on Industrial Relations (AJPIR) (ILO, 2004b; ASEAN, 
2006). 
 
With its ASEAN Vision 2020, ASEAN leaders vow to establish a 
community of caring societies with a common regional identity. In October 
2003, they returned to Bali to update the original Bali Concord that laid the 
foundation for ASEAN cooperation. The declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali 
Concord II) provided for the establishment of an ASEAN community with three 
pillars, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). 
 
The Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) recognises the need to increase the 
participation of Track II (Asian People’s Assembly, ASEAN ISIS, universities) 
and other mechanisms (ASEAN Business Council, ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Organisation) in promoting political development initiatives. Such participation 
was encouraged in Malaysia during the 11th ASEAN Summit by which direct 
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 Regional Conference on Trade Union and NGO Collaboration in Promoting the Rights and Well-Being 
of Migrant Workers, September 7-8, 2006, Pasig City, Philippines. 
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civil society input was given to ASEAN. Civil society participation should be 
improved: first by institutionalising the Civil Society Conference and expanding 
its participation, and second, by easing or eliminating or otherwise instituting a 
friendlier CSO accreditation system in ASEAN. The difficulty of accessing this 
system resulted in less than 60 CSOs officially accredited by ASEAN (Chavez, 
2006:10) More emphasis on civil society participation can also be an important 
incentive to overcome the absence of a tradition of free and critical CSOs 
(Schmit, 1996: 178-187). The first ASEAN Civil Society Conference took place 
in Shah Alam (Malaysia) in December 2005. Some important proposals were: “to 
deliberate the ASEAN charter, to involve civil society and other interested 
groups through public hearings in all ASEAN countries and (…) establishing a 
mechanism such as a Non-Governmental Liaison Center or a Permanent Civil 
Society Consultative Forum composed of civil society organisations independent 
from the governments and other influences. This will help to systematically 
channel civil society inputs to the ASEAN Secretariat and other ASEAN 
processes” (ASEAN, 2005).52  
 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) contains in itself no provision as 
regards migration and labour mobility, but it includes provisions related to the 
GATS Mode 4, with the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services. The 
ASEAN also enhanced skill recognition with Skill Recognition Arrangements. In 
the field of professional recognition, registers such as the Chartered Professional 
Engineers Register (ACPER) have been established. These registers are designed 
to reduce barriers to international mobility of professional engineers and 
architects within the Members’ economies through the establishment of a soft 
meta-control for registered engineers and architects.  
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 Various ASEAN CSOs have been meeting to reflect on ASEAN’s role and future and to discuss 
specific concerns ranging from the environment to human rights. The ASEAN People’s Assembly, which 
was launched in 2000, is one such example of a collective endeavour that seeks to address issues of 
relevance to the region. On 20 September 2006, a seminar on building an ASEAN +3 Community by 
strengthening the roles of civil society has been organised by the National Economic and Social Advisory 
Council (NESAC) of Thailand. For ASEAN +3, there should be a discussion, among CSOs on their 
cooperation to build a community of caring societies and on the desirability and feasibility for the 
establishment of national Economic and Social Councils, learning on existing experiences, and for the 
establishment of the ASEAN +3 Economic and Social Council, learning on EESC’s experiences. The 2nd 
ASEAN Civil Society Conference took place in Cebu City (the Philippines) in December 2006. 
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Other regional institutions have dealt with migration issues as a way to 
enhance trade relations and economic development in the regions, and, in that 
sense, have developed systems to facilitate the movement and circulation of 
certain categories of persons for limited periods of time. These Asian regional 
organisations favour openness, participation on a voluntary basis, consultations, 
both formal and informal, and a conjunction of binding and non-binding 
approach to migration management. 
 
SAARC promotes non-binding arrangements based on mutual interest and 
understanding. There again, the main focus remains economic development, with 
a particular interest in free trade, but also on social issues, culture, environment, 
etc, with the adoption of the Trade Liberalisation Programme to be implemented 
until 2016. In 1992, SAARC developed a visa exemption scheme, restricted to 
only 21 categories of persons. Moreover, in January 2002, SAARC adopted a 
regional Convention on trafficking of persons. 
 
Improving mutual recognition has also become an objective of SAARC. In 
1989, its leaders decided to include education in the agreed areas of cooperation 
and established a Technical Committee on Education, which was transformed 
into the Technical Committee on Human Resource Development in 1999. This 
reorganisation is to be seen in the context of a new emphasis on human resource 
development for the future of South Asia. In 2002, with the occasion of the 
eleventh summit, the leaders decided to put the development of common 
educational standards through uniform methods of instruction and teaching aids 
on the agenda. Such common standards are seen as vital for improving the 
qualification of the members’ labour force and for facilitating the mutual 
recognition of qualification. A committee of Heads of University Grants 
Commission/Equivalent Bodies was established in 2003 with a view of 
elaborating the necessary modalities for the implementation of the leaders’ 
recommendation. The committee agreed on minimum requirements for the 
Bachelor degree and recommended that the degrees awarded by chartered 
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universities in the region should be recognized by all member states based on the 
number of years studied, grades and credits obtained. Recognition of degrees will 
enhance the mobility of highly skilled labour and is thus crucial for the regional 
integration through stronger links in trade, transport, movement of people and 
flow of ideas. With India taking the lead, heads of state or government of 
SAARC underlined their willingness to ease visa regime on the occasion of their 
fourteenth summit in New Delhi, held in April 2007.   
 
The Unified Economic Agreement signed in November 1981 opens the 
route for the AGCC countries to build a joint labour market policy and a GCC 
Free Trade Area. This Agreement set out that equal treatment of movement, 
work, residence and inheritance should be guaranteed by similar AGCC market 
regulations (AGCC Secretariat General, 1981). The 2001 Economic Agreement 
between the AGCC states reinforced this principle, and stipulated that the 
movement of workers can be in both private and governmental sectors. 
Furthermore, Art.16 highlights that Member States should harmonize their labour 
policies in order to remove the barriers of intra-GCC movement of national 
labour force (AGCC Secretariat General, 2001). However, even if national labour 
mobility is without restraints, in practice, the Economic Agreement is not 
significantly carried out (Badr-El-Din A/ Ibrahim, 2005:15). In 2005, Saudi 
Arabia adopted a new employment law, stipulating that in companies 75% of the 
workers should be Saudi nationals. Nevertheless, due to intra-regional labour 
migration the financial flows from the host countries to workers’ countries of 
origin increased, via labour remittances. These remittances contributed to 
diminishing the levels of poverty in labour-exporting countries, especially in the 
rural areas, from which most migrant labours originate. At the same time, 
migrant workers contributed to the economic revitalization of the host countries. 
Both labour migration and labour remittances have an important role in 
“integrating Arab markets with labour surplus and those with labour shortage” 
(ESCWA, 2007:175). 
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In the framework of the ANZCERTA, the Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (TTMRA) was established in 1996. The mutual 
recognition agreement builds on the mutual recognition agreement between the 
Australian Government and the State and Territory Governments of 1992, but 
includes New Zealand as well.53 The recognition mechanism of the agreement is 
far-reaching and resembles in many respects the recognition arrangement of the 
EU. It builds on the country of origin principle, that is to say the agreement that a 
person registered to practise an occupation in one of the parties is entitled to 
practise an equivalent occupation in the other parties (with some exceptions, e.g. 
medical practitioners) (TTMRA Para G). In the field of regulated professions, a 
number of mutual recognition agreements have been established between the two 
countries. 
 
APEC is basically a forum to facilitate trade and investment. Labour issues 
in APEC have been mostly limited to human resources, productivity, worker 
training, and education issues. Despite efforts of the ICFTU’s Asia Pacific 
Labour Network (ICFTU/APLN), labour rights have not been addressed. 54 
APEC developed the APEC Business Travel Card to facilitate the movement of 
business people. It also leads some activities as regards information exchange on 
migration. A Human Resources Development Working Group (HRD), 
established in 1990, aims at facilitating recognition of qualifications between the 
participating members. It also fosters links and strengthens collaborative 
initiatives between the members by organising regular meetings of education 
ministers. One major outcome in the field of professional recognition so far has 
been the APEC Engineers Register. The register was launched in 2000 followed 
by the Register for Architects in 2005 (APEC, 2005). 
 
A regional qualifications framework has also moved up the political agenda 
in the Asia Pacific region. Australia has declared its interest in working 
collaboratively with regional partners to develop an Asian Pacific qualifications 
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 http://www.coag.gov.au/mra/ttmra.htm  
54
 ICFTU/APLN 2004: Labour in the Future of the APEC Community, ICFTU/APLN Statement to the 
APEC Leaders’ Meeting, Santiago, 20-21 November.  
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framework. So far, the APEC members Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Mexico have developed their own national 
qualifications frameworks. In recent years, the revision the UNESCO convention 
on the recognition of higher education for the Asian Pacific region has become a 
topic on the regional agenda (UNESCO, 2000). 55  Based on an Australian 
initiative, the organisation University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific (UMAP) 
has developed the UMAP Credit Transfer System (UCTS). The issue of quality 
assurance and accreditation has also moved to the top of the agenda. The Asia-
Pacific Quality Network (APQN) has been developed with a view to promoting 
quality assurance in higher education and building alliances between quality 
assurance and accreditation agencies. As in the European and African contexts, 
the revision of the UNESCO recognition convention, complemented by a number 
of criteria and standards further specifying what counts as substantial difference, 
would provide an interesting instrument for recognition of higher education 
qualifications. A regional qualifications framework could be another, less 
binding instrument making it possible to extend these standards to vocational 
training.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This report has addressed the trends and challenges with respect to the 
deepening of the social dimension of regional integration in light of the 
recommendations of the WCSDG (2004). We focused thereby on labour-related 
issues. Emerging regional initiatives and policies in the fields of health or 
security have not been addressed. Education has been only addressed with 
regards to recognition arrangements which have, however, an impact on 
domestic education and qualification systems.  
 
As suggested in the WCSDG Report, regional integration can contribute to 
a fair globalization in different ways: (i) by strengthening democratic regional 
governance and establishing institutionalised social dialogues, (ii) by linking 
                                               
55
 The Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in 
Asia and the Pacific was adopted in Bangkok on 16 December 1983 (UN Treaty Series No. 32021). 
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trade liberalization to the protection of labour rights, (iii) by contributing to a 
more development-friendly investment regime, and (iv) by building regulatory 
frameworks for labour migration. 
 
As a general conclusion of our review, it can be said that the social 
dimensions of regional integration can be broadened and deepened in different 
ways. How this process is actually taking place (or, in some cases, why it is not 
taking place) in particular regions depends on the forms and contents of the 
regional institutions that are (being) built in different regions and the particular 
combination of demand for and supply of regional social policies that is in place. 
A general tendency can be perceived though that consciousness about the need 
for more and new policy initiatives in this area at the regional level is rising 
among several actors. More shallow forms of regional integration and inter-
regional relations introduce social issues as part of the broader attempts to 
manage and regulate intra- or inter-regional flows of goods and services (trade), 
capitals (investment), and people (migration). In deeper, broader and more 
institutionalised forms of regionalism, more or less embryonic forms of what 
could be called regional social policies can and do emerge, through policy 
approximation, coordination and/or convergence. However, policy spill-over 
mechanisms and policy sequencing within regional integration processes are still 
not very well understood, mainly because they remain under-studied – even if 
some new trends in regionalism studies are emerging, addressing these important 
questions. 
 
From our review of trends and challenges in different regions in the world, a 
number of recent developments are worth highlighting. We started with the case 
of the European Union, where regional social policy has been gradually built up 
since the 1980s and which is an important regional actor with respect to the 
discussion on a Fair Globalization. At the intra-regional level, recent 
developments include the strengthening of the EESC, the inclusion of the new 
member countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the EU’s structural 
policies and funds, the reorientation of cohesion policies towards the objectives 
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of the Lisbon agenda, and the work on the mutual recognition of qualifications 
(EQF, ECTS). The EU has also continued to pursue a social agenda in its 
relations with other countries and regions. Apart from its contribution to the 
work done by multilateral institutions, the EU continued with its flexible 
approach regarding non-core labour standards, incorporated the promotion of 
decent work and social cohesion in its external social agenda, and promoted 
inter-regional social dialogues. The European case shows finally that with the 
development of regional social policies, it is likely that tensions will occur 
between the social and economic objectives of the regional integration project. 
The challenge for the EU, and for other regions, is to strike a sustainable balance 
between both sets of objectives on the basis of a regional political process. 
 
We have seen that although there is quite some uncertainty about the model 
that will be followed in the Latin American and, especially, South American 
integration processes, there is a clear tendency towards the strengthening of the 
social dimension in several of the sub-regions. This is supported by new political 
coalitions and the broader civil society. It is the case of the Andean Community 
but especially MERCOSUR where a new social agenda has been adopted, the 
Social Institute of Mercosur has been created and the Fund for Structural 
Convergence was launched.  
 
In Africa and Asia, progress has been made with respect to the 
institutionalization of regional social dialogues, involving both traditional and 
new social partners; this was especially the case in the African Union, ECOWAS 
and ASEAN. Concrete steps have also been set with respect to the promotion of 
the free mobility of labour and the portability of skills in ECOWAS, SADC, 
SAARC, the GCC and APEC. 
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